Montesquieu’s Esprit des Lois simultaneously rejects Aristotelian virtue and universal (i.e., Lockean) liberalism by asserting that moral vices and sociocultural particularisms determine the best mankind can hope for. Man’s nature is a source of justice in the Hobbesian sense of self-preservation, but only as refracted through custom and circumstance. History not teleology holds the key to political comity.
Like Aristotle, Montesquieu studies political regimes; however, whereas for the former the goal of a republic is the best use of freedom (i.e., virtue), for the latter it’s freedom itself. Anticipating Hegel, in a regime where freedom is less than ne plus ultra, some will oppress others simply to avoid oppression. Montesquieu also denies Aristotle’s exultation of the philosophic gentlemen or the statesman. Through private vice such as building wealth, which leads to superabundance, public virtue emerges and thence to patriotism. Religious (e.g., Christian) virtue unacceptably contests the state’s ends. Pangle shows Montesquieu’s definition creates an egalitarian politics with no definite end, only relative characteristics and lack of oppression.
The political sphere is not the source of society’s way of life. Statecraft is less important than the past, subconsciously carried forward. In emphasizing history as revealing social mores, Montesquieu can be seen as the progenitor of sociology, and more obviously foreshadowing Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Cool climates promote restlessness and more specifically scrutiny of government, revealing man’s passion for security, since liberty is an opinion of security. Also in the future, Burke would emphasize custom and Rousseau set aside the ancient emphasis on excellence in favor of base equality and freedom.
A republic (whether aristocratic or democratic) is more easily achieved in small, agrarian units. Montesquieu makes the case for separation of powers, moderate (limited) criminal law, and commerce as harnessing man’s passions to the general welfare. He favored competition between aristocrats and commoners, mediated by monarchy, to check tyranny and also to promote excellence as against mediocrity. As a formula: balance of power and separation of power promotes efficiency (i.e., minimum of friction) in reaching civic ends. In Montesquieu’s treatment of law, one foresees utilitarianism: restraints are to provide universalization of liberty and security, not the promotion of higher ends. Economic superabundance provides for social goods, such as freedom to philosophize. The English system provides an example. It lacks politesse but evidences morals. The English are not worldly but usefully focused on commerce. Consequently their political liberties are well balanced, exemplary. Yet Montesquieu overlooks the Tory institutional loyalties which are the foundation of social opinion, Pangle writes.
The legislator is to be prudent, not high minded, working through man’s passions. To understand a law, Montesquieu says, we have to view its intent, what’s it’s trying to solve. He is modern in espousing a system of institutional balance and competing interests, and preeminently insists on the applicability of circumstance as manifest through historic custom. His views failed to foresee or provide for defense against the French Revolution, Pangle observes, and paradoxically underestimated the durability of English liberty. The author asks: is formulaic security yet to be overwhelmed by man’s intrinsic nature? But Montesquieu, in bringing the principles of political thought down to the realm of current events, calls us to a contemporary accountability.