Surveys continuity and change in the business of baseball, 1903-2003. The New York Yankees, the first to operate as a corporation rather than a lifestyle business, have set the standards for commercial operations and, accordingly, on-field success. From the 19th century, although the game was played nationwide, the Major Leagues were confined to the Northeast and Midwest, owners pruned weaker teams and behaved as a cartel as regards player employment via the reserve clause. Revenue depended on daytime attendance; Sunday games, which enabled the working public to attend, fully arrived only in the second decade of the 20th century; the ‘Chicago rule’ ensured one team in a two-team town was always on the road. 1903’s consolidation abandoned the southern frontier cities of Baltimore, Washington, and Louisville, leaving Cincinnati and St. Louis as the outposts. This geographic arrangement worked well for the first half of the century. The Yankees’ rise past the Boston Red Sox and the Giants was based on management’s willingness to reinvest in the team, and also exemplifies the contemporary ‘managerial revolution’, or administrative hierarchy as a source of performance and durability. (1960s-era ownership by CBS demonstrated limits to corporate efficiency.) St. Louis and Branch Rickey sought to overcome New York’s edge via a network of emerging players, but the farm system was ultimately ineffective: the Cardinals rose and fell with Rickey’s judgment, and the Yankees continued to predominate the World Series. Problems in established markets, rather than visionary expansion, prompted relocation of Boston’s Braves to Milwaukee, St. Louis’ Browns to Baltimore (renamed the Orioles), and Philadelphia’s Athletics to Kansas City. The Dodgers and Giants also left New York for domestic reasons, although Los Angeles and San Francisco were new markets. Walter O’Malley is portrayed as unwilling to compromise on Flushing Meadows, where the Mets were born, while the Giants panicked in moving by result of their cross-town rivals’ departure. As is true elsewhere, too much time is spent on intramural New York affairs, and not enough on the decision making in the Californian cities. Integration brought exciting new players into the game, following the Dodgers, most often in the National League sides; but New York continued to predominate in the 1950s, particularly the Dodgers. Baseball’s business model began changing with the debut of radio and then television. But the game missed an opportunity to equalize ‘small’ and ‘big’ market teams, underscoring its tendency to react than to plan for major junctures. Not Curt Flood by Jim ‘Catfish’ Hunter and Andy Messersmith – not the reserve clause but free agency – set off the player salary escalation which reshaped baseball. In the face of predictions that big market teams would collect the best talent, parity emerged while the Yankees fell to consecutive losing seasons. But there began 25 years of labor strife. While concerned with New York – the author notes the Mets and the Yankees took decade-long turns in winning the metropolitan attendance battle, roughly corresponding with the teams’ playing success – the author omits discussing the abandonment of the first and second divisions in favor of East and West, and then into three groups as well as the introduction of inter-league play. Fetter’s treatment of the 2000 ‘blue ribbon’ panel on baseball is unconvincing; he does not understand equality of opportunity. The conclusion is tepid. An interesting book that does not quite deliver.