United Germany, though evidencing the thirst for liberty and flourishes of superlative culture, succumbed to the seduction of power and consequences of political failure to embrace liberalism, its people transformed from a Kulturvolk to a Machtvolk. Responsibility stems from Bismarck’s nationalism, which excluded simultaneous transition to popular sovereignty; Hitler’s cataclysm made it newly possible; but Craig’s account overlooks the historic loss of Prussia.
After the Austrian war, Bismarck conciliated liberal opinion in order to coopt the southern Catholic states (opposed to agrarian Prussian aristocrats) which had blocked the Zollparlament in 1868; Bismarck had overestimated the economy’s integrative capacity. No politician dared oppose the chancellor after 1870, yet still he reserved local prerogatives including education, policy, and revenue generation to the lander (especially Bavaria). The constitution, meant to be efficient vis-à-vis provincial rivalries without curtailing the Prussian monarchy or aristocracy, acknowledged 18 states plus Alsace-Lorraine; it contained no bill of citizen rights. Politics did not attract capable men and competing interests were seen to undermine the superior purpose of the Hegelian state. The Kulturkampf set Germans against one another, damaging the authority of civil courts and more generally liberalism. Simultaneously, the Grunderzeit kindled modern anti-Semitism. Foreign policy was defensive, but Bismarck’s manhandling the foreign service undermined its professionalism and his machinations (more so than his overt character) were responsible for his fall. At the end of his career, he had no answers other than threat of violence – a tactic which would tragically persist.
The country’s position deteriorated under the feckless Wilhelm II, who never read the constitution, holding to divine right and direct rule. With von Holstein he sought and failed to draw closer to Russia, seeking like all German elites recognition as a great power, when it would have been better to pull back and redress social imbalances. Bernhard von Bulow hoped an aggressive foreign policy would disarm the left; Bethman Hollweg succeeded to debt and a military which saw itself as an increasingly necessary independent actor. In these 1890s, trade unions sought for social democracy and responsible government, but were demonized by elites, while the parliamentarians had no experience of using supply to leverage the executive arm. Effectively blocked by parties organized on the basis of economic class and so averse to coalition, Bethman become reliant on military influence as well as reserves of power in Prussia, the Conservative Party, the Pan German league, and the agricultural and industrial lobbies. Aside from Wilhelm II himself, Bulow and Tirpiz were the most reckless ministers, the latter converting the Bismarckian policy into grasping Weltpolitik. The arms race with Britain, the imperialism evident in the Baghdad railway, and the exclusion of Russian grain (at behest of Prussians) as well as the social Darwinism of conservative Germany professoriate guided the country toward World War I
In 1914 the problem was to survive a protracted conflict with inferior resources, industrial organization, and sea power. Food was an immediate liability: prewar Germany had imported one-third of supply. Ludendorff’s appointment was a political revolution: power was overtly transferred to the high command. The shocking terms of Brest-Litovsk aroused Western antagonism as well as resistance among Eastern nations which saw the nature of German aggression.
Normalcy persisted During the Berlin commune: ‘most don’t bother to participate in the political events which shape their lives’. The Kiel mutinists were liberals not Bolshevisks. Ebert, facing anarchy, decided to side with the military, at first understandably, over time less plausibly. Weimar ministries came to exist at the sufferance of parties or factions. Conversely, since federal law did not supercede the lander, Weimar’s true (anti-democratic) enemies exploited the gaps. Inflation was rooted not in the government fiscal policies but the wartime administration, which relied on loans not tax. Arts and culture were second to none in Germany history: poetry, novels, Expressionism, Bauhaus. But the bohemians, disappointed by 1918 and opposing contemporary ministries for their military affinities, did little to defend the political order. The universities remained conservative. The ‘average’ German resorted to glorifying war as an outlet for tragedy: the German sin is to take refuge in destiny; the ideal German resists politics, when submitting to the necessity, he works via force.
At the end of Weimar, the Mittelstand was disillusioned with Bruning’s reliance on Socialists, but industrialists did not rush to help Hitler (as often supposed). Conducted under the rubric of Gleichschaltung (‘putting into the same gear’), the Nazi takeover entailed dissolving state government and the Reichsrat, purging the civil service, abolishing political parties, and coopting trade unions and eventually (in 1938) the army. But in 1933’s preparations for purging the Brown Shirts, Hitler claimed revolutions should become evolutions.
Mein Kampf established Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy – but Russia was always the goal. The early success of Hitler’s foreign policy obscured the anarchy of competing planning agencies and willy-nilly commissions. Only SS terror prevented collapse. Germany could have been brought to heel by its balance of payments. Industry shifted from western lander to south central states. Wages kept pace with inflation (although the author notes 20 percent went to taxes!). The giant industrial concerns most benefitted from Jewish confiscation. Following America’s entering World War II, Germans blamed the Fuhrer, remembering the prior conflict. After 1942’s African reverses, Hitler descended from daring strategist to meddling tactician, prohibiting for example retreat from Stalingrad on grounds of morale.
Early on, Nietzsche is given commanding effect: military victories are not political wins; proficiency does not equal virtue or morality. While undoubtedly advanced by recent scholarship, a masterful telling.