Assesses the historiography of George III’s early reign — how he intended to govern from 1760-63, and whether it constituted a significant break from his Hanover predecessors. The contest between neo-historicist Whig and more overtly partisan Tory interpretations culminated in Whig ascendancy, until the arrival the Namierite school of ‘structured analysis’, which asserted behavior is explicable according to classifiable political types (i.e., MPs). Burke, as a contemporary naturally belonged to the Whigs, although he was ‘satisfied’ with subsequent reform and so able to turn against the persecutors of the French monarchy. Butterfield asserts history is ‘both story and study’ (pp. 294-295): readers shouldn’t be able to guess the outcome. Meanwhile, an individual’s deeds are to be assessed in the context of the ideas then held, and primary sources are valuably supplemented by external evidence and evaluation. As to the historian, he is to be diligent in search of new or novel evidence, responsible in the use of evidence, and the best presenter of it. No amount of learning can surmount deficient imagination.
Month: May 2022
13. Hamburger, Macaulay and the Whig Tradition (12 Jul 2017)
Thomas Macaulay, conventionally seen as a Whig, was in fact a trimmer, primarily concerned to reconcile opposing politicians in order to preserve civil order. Danger lay both in ultra Tory reaction or democratic or religious radicalism. Macaulay followed Burke in holding that respect for tradition creates a political environment safe for debate. ‘Noiseless’ revolutions point to correct decisions, and to be too late to make generous concessions is a cardinal policy error. To productively transform a ‘conjuncture’ (i.e., a revolutionary situation) into reform is high statesmanship. Macaulay gained notoriety for interpreting the Great Britain’s constitutional struggles of the 17th and 18th centuries, so as to make them a common (i.e., public) possession; however, his intellectual glosses and programic reading of history reduced his academic stature. Further, his temperament was unsuited for trimming, and although a believer in induction, he also held the progressive’s belief in ends justifying the means. History has no intrinsic use, but ought to be mined for precedent and instruction; more particularly, contra Burke revolution ought to be judged by the consequences, not the substance of events.
14. Plumb, England in the 18th Century (4 Aug 2017)
An opinionated survey of the 18th century which ever seems to anticipate the coming of the 20th. Plumb divides the years 1714-1815 into three eras, those of Walpole, Chatham, and Pitt the younger, while elucidating the incipience of the Industrial Revolution from 1750. At the start of the era, for all the excitement of the closing of the revolutionary era, the country was decidedly premodern. Improved social organization emerged through local administrative reform. So too politics were personal rather than based in the party: Walpole sought to marginalize Tories but was too engaged in courtly intrigue to be a master statesman; his usage of patronage enabled the Duke of Newcastle to establish the Whig ascendancy at the expense of the Hanovers; the landed gentry became the opposition. Chatham, taking power in 1756, surmounted the French but shortly England lost the American colonies as England under George III failed to recognize they had come of age. But she gained immense wealth and power from India. The now-familiar enclosures of the English countryside were taking shape, while towns began turning from administrative centers into early industrial hubs centered around the mill or mine (instead of the feudal castle). Social organization improved with still more local administration, and in combination with improved medicine and public health, helped the poor live longer and so create a rising commercial elite — who bumped up against the squirearchy. Burke’s campaign for economic reform (of the monarchy) trumped association reform (of parliament), which had to wait until 1832. Also in the second half of the century, Bohemian romantics abjured aristocracy and classicism, and embraced the French Revolution, as did Fox, whose break with Burke split the party for a generation. Most of the nation rallied behind Pitt (supported by George and the City of London) against the French threat, initially by sea power alone, and then to the standard of Wellington. The English emerged justifiably proud but also arrogant.
Against populism in American conservatism
It seems the Republican party, that is the official (officious?) arbiter of American conservatism, is obliged to fight a two-front war:
What began in the twentieth century as an elite-driven defense of the classical liberal principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution ended up, in the first quarter of the twenty-first century, as a furious reaction against elites of all stripes. Many on the right embrace a cult of personality and illiberal tropes. The danger was that the alienation from an antagonism toward American culture and society expressed by many on the right could turn into a general opposition to the constitutional order. That temptation had been present in the writings of the Agrarians, in the demagogy of Tom Watson, Hue Long, and Father Charles Coughlin, in the conspiracies of Joseph McCarthy, in the racism of George Wallace, in the radicalism of
Triumph
, in the sour moments of the paleo-conservatives, in the cultural despair of the religious right and in the rancid antisemitism of the alt-right. But it was cabined off off. It was contained. That would not be the case forever – as Trump and January 6, 2021 had shown.
15. Wood, Radicalism of the American Revolution (10 Aug 2017)
The American Revolution exhibited none of the socioeconomic conditions classically associated with political upheaval, yet was a time of thoroughgoing change. Spanning 1740-60s (i.e., before the French and Indian War) to the Jacksonian era, Wood narrates a series of transformations in colorful detail, emphasizing social phenomena. For example, vertical connections of patronage were replaced by egalitarianism, as paternal authority began melting away. Leisure became a suspect trait of residual aristocracy; property transformed from a source of authority to merely another economic interest. Superior virtue was seen to derive from common moral sense, sharpened by participating in society (not government), rather than educated reason. In this way, the emergent middle class fused the gentility of the upper class with the bona fides of the working class to create a distinctly American ‘moral hegemony’. In the economic sphere, commerce which had been predicated on trust (credit) became more purely transactional, while the colonial ‘trading society’ predicted on business with England grew aware of its internal market and thus potential self-sufficiency. Servitude — save for slavery — all but dissolved. In the Federalist era, the granting of private charters became commonplace, such that not every purpose was publicly oriented, thereby raising questions of property rights; so judges became arbiters of public power versus private rights. Politically, government office went from an obligation to a source of social standing. Proto-group rights (first manifest by anti-Federalists), replaced disinterest as the defining standard of decision making. Then the first avowed political parties gook hold as the expression of loyalty to common interest and advancement. The Jacksonian age further restored monarchical characteristics under the cloak of popular rhetoric, such as the spoils system. Wood concludes: the revolution was about deciding who are America’s proper sociopolitical leaders, elsewhere noting the founders died depressed as the new society zoomed past republicanism into democracy. Deeply researched, the author’s taste for anecdote works to crowd out military, economic, and political events (context). Oddly, there is little discussion of Turner’s social mobility in migration, nor much regional color — although the author displays humility in allowing the character of local histories will require adjustments to the main narrative. A major question left unanswered is why the resultant concentration of wealth and broader inequality did not foster increased political instability?
16. Cassirer, Rousseau, Goethe, Kant (16 Aug 2017)
The Enlightenment was equally a philosophical and empirical worldview — right thinking as a precursor to right action. Cassirer shows Kant appreciated Rousseau as the ‘Newton of the moral universe’. For example, Kant saw that Rousseau’s state of nature was important not because of its lost splendor but for what society should aspire to: the Swiss sought to revisit man’s natural state in order to identify ‘errors’ of contemporary society. Where Rousseau deduced this ideal, however, Kant (like Burke) saw civilization as the focal point of humanity, and declared the task of philosophy (i.e., defining what it is to be human) began from this point. They share a grounding in the priority of the individual’s rights, and saw conscience as the basis for appreciating God — not metaphysical proof. But where Rousseau is optimistic of man’s increasing happiness, Kant departed in holding that deeds not outcomes are the of final importance: existence is to prove humanity’s worthiness of freedom. Ultimately, Kant gave Rousseau’s conceptual work rigor. Conversely, in the second essay Cassirer shows how Kant’s empiricism established a basis for Goethe’s theoretical advances, such as metamorphosis, the process of becoming in nature. This bore fruit in the arts: both believed that genius give rules and form to creation; science is more beholden to experience, although the two differed on degree. Goethe concluded understanding doesn’t derive (a priori) from nature but is inspired by it. Separately, Kant held everything has value or worth. Value has a substitute, whereas worth is unique. That which is truly worth is borne of moral choices, which alone bear dignity.
17. Bennett and Miles, Riding Shotgun: Role of the COO (26 Aug 2017)
An academic study of a nebulous executive role, driven by identifying commonalities surfaced through interviews. There are several common models — ‘two in a box’, mentorship, divide and conquer (outside/inside), successor planning — any of which can work provided the model is agreed. Complementary skills and mutual trust, as well as ability to resolve decisions gracefully (with the benefit belong to the executive) are vital. The operating offer must balance the executive’s vision and the corporate strategy with delivering results.
18. Gay, Why the Romantics Matter (27 Aug 2017)
The Romantics located the source of artistic passion in ‘bold subjectivity’, the celebration of individual idiosyncrasy. The movement initially sought for inspiration in erotic love (France), God (Germany), and nature (England), but at its height in the four decades around the turn of the 20th century, the self predominated. The movement was aided by the rise of Western leisure and middlemen / taste makers, and paradoxically was first to scorn the bourgeois that supported new styles in art, literature, drama, and so on. Using a seemingly dated lens, Gay frequently refers to Freud as a kind of Greek chorus, psychoanalysis being a tool for revealing man’s secrets. If art is unconcerned with virtue, why be concerned with art?
19. Ramadan, Islam: The Essentials (8 Sep 2017)
Ostensibly a theological overview, the book reads as a plea for reformist Islam against literalist and traditionalist schools. A preliminary historical sketch emphasizes the ‘pragmatic’ character of military conquest by Mohammed and his early successors, in keeping with the ‘fellowship’ of Islam among Judaism and Christianity. As tradition set in — Sunni gained a reputation for deriving authority from the people, Shi’a from elites — Islam exhibited a crisis of confidence as early as the 12th century. By the 19th, as colonialism entered even the holy lands, Islam became a symbol of resistance to Western values, in which literalism sharpened the contrast. The emphasis became unique rules and mores, sometimes evidencing the sociocultural traits of Arab, Turk, or Persian people rather than the ethics of the Koran. (Ironically, during the early modern period it was seen as sensual and permissive.) The author acknowledges Islamic societies fall short of cosmopolitan, if not to say progressive, socioeconomic standards. Formalism has all but banished critical thinking needed by democracy; but the causes are said to be temporal, worldly; he does not confront so-called political Islam’s descent to terrorism. Islam needs widespread education in legalistic analysis of the Koran — a tall order; ultimately it may instead require a charismatic, peaceful figure such as Martin King. Useful as an overview, engaging during parts of the second half, limited as a sociopolitical solution.
20. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam (14 Sep 2017)
An extended essay on the place of Islam in the global sphere, generally recurring to three themes: sources and consequences of theocracy, Islam’s historical relationship with the West, and Islam in the 20th and 21st centuries. In contrast to Judeo-Christianity, Islam can be seen as a religion subdivided into nations; Christian clergy haven’t enjoyed equivalent social authority in at least three centuries. There are chiefly two political traditions, quietism in authoritarian society and radical activism, both borne of Mohammed’s life (and of course several schools of legal interpretation). As regards the West, the Crusades were unimportant to contemporary Ottomans. The end of the expansionary era (as marked by Lepanto and Vienna) was more significant. Most important, Islam was already superseded by European technological and economic progress, such as Atlantic maritime trade, and well closed to foreign intellectual currents — since the 9th century, only 100,000 Western books have been translated in Arabic, the equivalent of a year’s production in Spain. Muslims never saw their expansion as imperial, but in the modern era, which began with the coming of Napoleon, fundamentalism has required an enemy. In 20th-century Arabia, Wahhabism allied to Saudi nationalism presented themselves as keepers of the holy land; with the decline of pan Arabism — only Palestine didn’t succeed in creating a nation-state — nationalism and fundamentalism have blurred. The Iranian revolution was a fundamentalist coup d’etat, and the author asserts the hostage crisis was a response to improving US ties. Similarly, first Sadat’s accord and then the collapse of the USSR forced Palestinians to talk with Israel. Latterly, terrorist bombings violate the Islamic prohibition against suicide (which is not proof of martyrdom), more evidence that fundamentalism has come to ignore its origins.