Narrates the foreign policies of Europe’s leading nations from mid-century civil strife through the conclusion of World War I. After 1848, balance-of-power calculation trumped the ideological standoff between conservatives (i.e., monarchists) and revolutionary nationalists. After World War I, Germany’s bid for continental mastery had not only obviated balance-of-power arrangements but also scuttled the system in favor of the 20th-century contest between communism and liberal democracy (Soviet Union vs. United States).

Balance of power was effected by design grounded in realism, not in treaties. Britain saw France as the keystone; Russia wished to push the two German powers into leading the defense of conservativism; Austria wanted Russian support; Prussia clung to traditional allies in Britain and Russia. Palmerstone thought BOP strengthened Germany by giving it a ‘free hand’; Bismarck agreed it was a means of security.

In 1848, the alternative to supporting the besieged Habsburg monarchy was the emergence of Hungary and unified Germany. Russia decided here interests lay in helping to restore Austria. During the Crimean War, Austria and Prussia avoided taking sides because the former was conflicted and the latter uninterested. The real stakes were Italian nationhood and the resolution of Germany. The war proved indecisive in these respects but created options for Napoleon III and then Bismarck. The Treaty of Paris, unlike the Congress of Paris following Waterloo, gave the deceptive impression of peace. (Coincidentally, it was the most successful invasion of Russian since 1800, reducing Russian prestige to the lowest point since 1721.)

Italy was more important to Europe prior to Germany’s industrial revolution; she could not make herself a nation. Austria could retain Italy only by conceding German leadership to Prussia; the basic principle of Habsburg diplomacy was to concede only after defeat; trying to retain both lost her both. Napoleon, meanwhile, bumbled into a policy of asserting ‘natural frontiers’ in aggrandizing Savoy. Italian unification finished Crimean destruction of post-Waterloo order; French ambitions of European hegemony were lost during 1863-66.

In dismembering Poland, Russia was no longer seeking Austro-Prussian unity. Prussia could subjugate the Poles, the Austrians could not. Her truly vital interests were outside the continent. (As an aside: most battles confirm the direction of events; Plevna in 1877-78 confirmed Turkish rule of the Bosporus Straights and Constantinople, giving the Ottoman Empire another 40 years; to this day, Russia remains confined to the Black Sea.)

Diplomacy is an engine of peace for those would have it. Bismarck’s convoluted doings played on European interests. The League of Three Emperors was anti-British, the Triple Alliance was contradictory. He favored Russia, disliked Austrians, and preferred France to Italy but above all sought prudential balance. Metternich’s system had been conservative, Bismarck’s was a ‘tyranny’ of German control, albeit pacific. Proper international order needs common principle, moral views, and treaties – Taylor favors Metternich.

Bismarck saw colonies in terms of European domination; England and Russia wanted to be left out of Europe to pursue empire. The Reinsurance Treacy (1882-83) ensured Germany would face a two-front war unless she abandoned Austria; Russian wanted Germany neutrality in a Habsburg conflict. Cancellation led to the Franco-German alliance, an arrangement unlike the German concord in that an autocratic and a revolutionary power came together. The chancellor’s successors lost the plot of continental domination by diplomacy and so were led toward war. It needn’t have been.

Europe would unite against Britain only when it had a clear champion: the age of African imperialism was merely postponement. During the 1890s the British were indeed isolated, Albion’s traditional Austrian links having faltered in 1894. Amid growing German predominance, the Franco-Russian tie-up unintentionally pushed Britain into Sudan (to protect Egypt vs French interests); the Boer War and the Anglo-Japanese pact underlined her solitude. Tirpitz’s naval buildup, instead of prompting Britain to buy Germany’s friendship, persuaded her to avoid conflict with France or Russia, and to adopt the ‘more than everyone else’ naval standard. Simultaneously, Weltpolitik combined with continental ambitions limited Germany’s options. The Dogger Bank affair’s denouement ended the expected (since Crimea) outcome of Anglo-Russian war.

British conservatives favored Germany, Liberals the Franco-Russian entente. Grey like most of his party repudiated BOP, but thought a scorned France would unite with Germany or Russia: Gallic independence became paramount, BOP came back to the fore, imperial interests which had predominated since 1860 were set aside. Once she had conciliated the other Great Powers to protect her empire, now she conceded imperial interests to defend the balance. Driven by trading and naval rivalry, in spite of tradition, Britain set herself against Germany.

Germany could not directly challenge Britain so long as there were two other independent powers. Abandoning the naval program might have won British neutrality, in which case she would have won the continental battle. The Moroccan crises were the point of no return. (To prove the point, the 1912-14 Balkan Wars, regarding the fate of Turkey in Europe and Asia, reduced Anglo-Russian goodwill, thereby reducing German tensions). These indirectly raised the question of French intentions should a Russo-German conflict break out: Poincare determined it would mean war no matter who started the affair, abandoning France’s a formerly defensive posture. German interests in the Baghdad railway and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire brought here into direct conflict with Russia for the first time, for the latter needed ‘neutral’ control of the Straights for shipping. Germany required Austria to gain control of the Near East, and so was captive to her weaker partner. Romanian interests, excited by the Balkan Wars, sought to free 2 million ethnic compatriots from Hungary, which was core to the Habsburgs.

Alliances didn’t cause WWI, Taylor says; every country had reasons to hesitate or doubt surety of gains. Even Germany’s primary motivation – whether naval power, Near Eastern interests, continental supremacy – cannot be certainly identified. But the Schlieffen Plan’s adoption, which required a quick-strike win in France to avoid prolonged two-front fighting, since necessitated commitment to action. Germany did not engineer August 1914 but welcomed the occasion, the Balkan Wars having false taught of a quick win.

During the great War, every small-state alliance was a hindrance. For example, but for Italy the Allies might otherwise have severed Austria from Germany. Civilians tried to negotiate, the generals to win outright. Eventually the former were pushed aside for Ludendorff, Clemenceau, Lloyd George. The war ended BOP as a system, the treaty sought to permanently cripple Germany’s Great Power capacity, Russia having fallen to revolution. In 1918 Europe ceased to be the world’s center, though the next struggle was not clarified until 1945, in a new ideological rivalry.