Nationalism, though often seen to have originated in 19th-century transitions from monarchical to republican government and self-determination, dates in England to the 10th century. This older archetype of shared culture, solidarity, and cohesive leadership is far from the racist phenomenon portrayed by contemporary academics.

History not ethnicity is the decisive feature of English nationalism. Alfred’s England, comprising Angles, Saxons, Danes, Vikings, and Britons, was based on Christianity and the common law, marked by equality before the law and trial by jury. The latter’s emphasis on content, not prescription, promoted a civic character and continuity, enshrining rights and resolving disputes where no law was established. It was a vital element of government and society in pre-Norman England. During Normanization, the common law gained strength by enhancing public power, that is the government’s ability to resolve, distinguishing between the crown as benign but rulers as (potentially) bad. Whereas the Church, though not taken over by the Danes, was Latinized by the invaders; upon French conquest of Normandy in 1203-04, Anglo-Norman elites were forced to choose sides.

The English vernacular became identified with the country in the 13th century, including literature such as Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales. The end of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453, when all save Calais was recaptured by the French) and Henry VIII’s reformation (1529-36, including sales of monasteries) marked decisive breaks with continental culture. The ‘new nationalism’ of 1453-1603 then added the rise of Parliament and popular acceptance of Protestantism (for example by Foxes’ Book of Martyrs). Elizabeth rejected looking into men’s consciousness, seeking only outward conformity, such that sects needn’t flee to Europe.

In British England, 1603-1783, the political history of the Stuarts and Hanovers can been seen partly as an attempt to reconcile ethnic diversity via Parliamentary sovereignty. Commencing in earnest with Cromwell’s postwar unification, nationalism was a byproduct, not the aim of racism. For England’s religious loyalties remained divided and 1707 created a multi-confessional state, Scotland’s Episcopacy having been replaced by Presbyterianism in 1689. Further the progressive Whiggish society (frequently in debt to the Scottish Enlightenment) saw itself as premised on political and cultural traits such as the Blackstone’s understanding of the Magna Carta, Petition of Right, and common law and Burke’s Glorious Revolution and Declaration of Right – but not ethnicity. Meanwhile, patriotic Anglo-Saxonism counted for little in the residents of Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, who viewed medieval history differently; Scotland retained the Roman law.

In the 18th century, stagecoaches were linking the country as never before, and then came Victorian railroads, both serving to strengthen communal ties. Speaking of Britain often meant England, albeit such works as Churchill’s History of the English-speaking Peoples were nuanced. By World War I, tensions between England and Britain fully emerged. But nationalism was also evident in the preference for the rural over the urban (especially London): manufacturing was only 150 years old, while villages dated to the Anglo-Saxon era. The decline of the British empire too rekindled English ways.

The next point of departure was 1973’s accession to the European Economic Community, though it had been presaged by the turn from the dominions to the multiethnic Commonwealth. The emphasis of the England’s latter 20th century was not empire or was but social progress and ‘diversity’. The Church of England’s decline played a substantial role in nationalism falling out of fashion. The common law too suffered at the hands of governments wanting to rule by statute as well as the invasion of EU Roman law. Regionalism rose in the 2010s, not just because of devolution but also through Cornish and Midlands resentment of London (‘leveling up’). That is, English nationalism confronts not only the Celts but also anti-southern sentiment, which again dispels simplified ethnic explanations. (Here is a reasonable plaint: why should some 120 MPs vote for England when the English cannot vote in Edinburgh, Cardiff, or Belfast?)

English nationalism is not merely a variety of anti-elitism. Black seeks to disentangle it from populism, which owes much to 20th-century Communist ideology (i.e., the supposed good of the people driven in a collective march forward – from the top downward). The contemporary left, focused on race and sex, makes no effort to unify. Englishness entails fair play, friendliness (but not intimacy) and helpfulness, individualism but concern for the less fortunate (but not communitarian), and traditionalism (settled Burkean prejudice), all toward an ideal of social cohesion and patriotism or love of one’s country. These elements, not merely disgust with unmanaged immigration – that is, no attempt at assimilation – were all evident in England’s leading the vote to exit the European union.