Traces the development and practice of British politics from the late 19th century to the 1950s, highlighting the consolidation of government and economic production and consumption in the ‘collective era’. Beer first describes four premodern mindsets: old Tory (hierarchic, corporatist), old Whig (which transposed executive power to the cabinet), liberal, and Radical. The Enclosure Acts of the 1700s indicated the introduction of group politics (albeit aristocracy, the balanced constitution, and mercantilism remained dominant), in a long-term transition from patronage to party. In the 1800s, the primary distinction between liberals and Radicals lay in the theory of representation, one favoring liberty to act one’s conscience (the ‘masterless man’) and the other the ‘will of the majority’; Radical politics nonetheless incompletely utilized party to express class and ideological ends, according to later Socialists. The collective era, which reached its height in the 1950s, introduced or reified corporatist forms of a managed economy in combination with the welfare state. Beer then analyzes the workings of the Labour Party since the 1890s. Socialist doctrine held that party program reflects class interest, and all important decisions were to be taken before reaching Parliament. In 1907, the party formally voted itself power to instruct its MPs, although Radical views of the state’s role in alleviating evil and creating good persisted until the 1920s. The miners union’s joining the Trades Union Congress in 1909 was initially seen as a setback, until its commitment to nationalization during World War I. In 1917, Labour broke with David Lloyd George; in 1918 it committed to state ownership of the means of production, a which was unchallenged until 1951. Beer writes that Labour had to do so to differentiate itself after the ‘entente cordial’ with Liberals in 1907. On taking power as a minority government in 1929, Ramsay MacDonald faced the choice of ideology or pragmatism. Needing Liberal support, he along with Snowden, Thomas, Henderson, and Webb chose the latter. By 1931, absent a clear answer to the depression, MacDonald was forced to accede to 10 percent cut in unemployment benefits in order to win loans from New York banks. Allowed to play a large role in Churchill’s wartime government, Atlee executed the Socialist nationalization program over 1945-51; however, pressed by increasingly negative balance of payments and simultaneous demand for domestic goods, the party-government determined to steer workers into export trades or production of popular goods. The problem became closing the ‘manpower gap’ and reducing volatility of demand, finance being secondary. But after the TUC’s 1946 opposition to wage restraint, Hugh Dalton was replaced by Stafford Cripps, who returned from physical controls to market manipulation – a shift which included manufacturers accepting reduced prices and profits. The deal fell apart in 1950 (following 1949’s devaluation of sterling), at which time the unions asserted a measure of independence from Labour, in order to directly participate in collectivist bargaining. This was crucial in forging the new social contract, the paradigm of the managed economy, which Beer dates to 1940 (not 1945, because it was then workers accepted sacrifices to win the war). Henceforth, class was again not inherently political and determinist. In the 1950s, commitment to nationalization and its residual class image came to hurt Labour (Beer notes that 1/3 of the working class consistently voted Conservative throughout), presaging party change. The Fabians counterattacked but the Parliamentary leadership along with the TUC, which provided more than 50 percent of party revenue, prevailed. Turning to the Conservative party, Beer revisits the old Tory and Disraeli’s ‘Tory democracy’ mindsets: belief in hierarchy; that society is an organic unit with a traditional (not rational) social ethic; that politics isn’t the highest calling but rather is an obligation in service of society; that the governing class leads by virtue of talent; that voters choose leaders, not policy, because of the leadership’s being in tune with changing circumstances, tradition, interest groups, and of course electoral calculation. Thus, in the 1930s the less ideological, more adaptable Tories converted to monetary expansion, mercantilism, and industrial and agriculture ‘rationalization’, thereby abandoning gold and free trade. Tariff ‘reform’, headed by Chamberlain, was an important step toward the managed economy. Trade associations, rising in response to unions (and in contrast to US antitrust doctrine), were the gateway to producer group representation. By the 1950s, the Conservatives too were ready for collectivism, in which 1) the managed economy relied on bargaining with producer groups and 2) the welfare state accommodated consumer interests, as represented by party-government bidding for votes. In the collective era, government couldn’t be separated from production and consumption: ‘consumer sovereignty’ trumped popular sovereignty, Beer concludes. Yet differences remained: Labour focused on equality of outcomes, the Tories, who presumed inequality because of hierarchy, on distribution of power. Thus the question of morality – the just distribution of power to rule – persisted: voluntarism, the view that human wishes are the basis of legitimacy, conflicts with rationalism, a theory of fair ends. Apart from Beer’s framework, collectivism was upended by the reemergence of supply-side economics, that prices communicate demand and so the allocation of resources and rewards.
Author: kurto
2. Carlo Rovelli, Seven Brief Lessons on Physics (2 February 2022)
Humanity’s understanding of the universe and its physics changes our conceptual ideas and natural philosophy. The author commences explaining the transition from Newton to Einstein, from mechanical laws to general relativity, the idea that space is not distinct from matter. Space ‘curves’ where there is matter, such as waves at seas, and it expands and contracts (e.g., oscillating universe and the collapse of stars into black holes), R describing its energy. In the rival quantum mechanics, however, which dates to Max Planck and Walter Heisenberg, electrons (and other constituent particles) jump from one atomic orbit to another, also supplanting Newtonian mechanics. No object has a definite, fixed position; the periodic table indicates proclivities. Reality is the interaction of quanta as explained by the Standard Model, effectively but not so eloquently as general relativity. The two paradigms conflict.
Next, the presence of heat indicates the future will be different from the past. Heat transfers to colder elements, it indicates friction. However, it transfers not by law but by probability, again demonstrating the relational character of nature. Consequently, physicists and philosophers have concluded the present is an illusion, the flow of time a failed generalization, humanity’s experience of memory is really built on statistical phenomena. Acknowledging the gap between relativity and quantum mechanism makes for considerable uncertainty, the author places much faith in future discovery. The heat present in black holes could be a Rosetta stone which would elaborate the combined workings of quantum, gravitational (i.e., relative), and thermodynamic phenomena. There could be a connection between time and heat.
Heidegger, skeptical of the discipline for such conclusions, is loosely castigated. So too German idealism is criticised for holding man as the summit of nature, conscious of itself. Nature is not conscious of humanity’s special status, the author writes. The bien pensant emerges in full cry – nature does not care about the human species, whose life is likely to be short and further curtailed by its own choices.
But where else does one find rationality, not simple probability, save in the deity or perhaps artificial intelligence (which is artificial)? What role does the empiricism of common sense play? Heidegger is onto something; philosophy shouldn’t slavishly copy physics.
11. Kaplan, Silicon Boys (17 Jul 2018)
A brisk, sometimes adoring treatment of the tech industry’s rise, circa 1970-2000. Kaplan often traverses the boundary running along technological vision and advancement and business gain and rapacity. Venture investors such as John Doerr receive individualized treatment to rival regulars such as Robert Noyce, Bill Gates, or Steve Jobs. There’s also a useful treatment of the Microsoft antitrust case. But although well researched and written, the book fails to address why so many talented people have dedicated their careers to the field.
12. Fetter, Taking on the Yankees (1 Aug 2018)
Surveys continuity and change in the business of baseball, 1903-2003. The New York Yankees, the first to operate as a corporation rather than a lifestyle business, have set the standards for commercial operations and, accordingly, on-field success. From the 19th century, although the game was played nationwide, the Major Leagues were confined to the Northeast and Midwest, owners pruned weaker teams and behaved as a cartel as regards player employment via the reserve clause. Revenue depended on daytime attendance; Sunday games, which enabled the working public to attend, fully arrived only in the second decade of the 20th century; the ‘Chicago rule’ ensured one team in a two-team town was always on the road. 1903’s consolidation abandoned the southern frontier cities of Baltimore, Washington, and Louisville, leaving Cincinnati and St. Louis as the outposts. This geographic arrangement worked well for the first half of the century. The Yankees’ rise past the Boston Red Sox and the Giants was based on management’s willingness to reinvest in the team, and also exemplifies the contemporary ‘managerial revolution’, or administrative hierarchy as a source of performance and durability. (1960s-era ownership by CBS demonstrated limits to corporate efficiency.) St. Louis and Branch Rickey sought to overcome New York’s edge via a network of emerging players, but the farm system was ultimately ineffective: the Cardinals rose and fell with Rickey’s judgment, and the Yankees continued to predominate the World Series. Problems in established markets, rather than visionary expansion, prompted relocation of Boston’s Braves to Milwaukee, St. Louis’ Browns to Baltimore (renamed the Orioles), and Philadelphia’s Athletics to Kansas City. The Dodgers and Giants also left New York for domestic reasons, although Los Angeles and San Francisco were new markets. Walter O’Malley is portrayed as unwilling to compromise on Flushing Meadows, where the Mets were born, while the Giants panicked in moving by result of their cross-town rivals’ departure. As is true elsewhere, too much time is spent on intramural New York affairs, and not enough on the decision making in the Californian cities. Integration brought exciting new players into the game, following the Dodgers, most often in the National League sides; but New York continued to predominate in the 1950s, particularly the Dodgers. Baseball’s business model began changing with the debut of radio and then television. But the game missed an opportunity to equalize ‘small’ and ‘big’ market teams, underscoring its tendency to react than to plan for major junctures. Not Curt Flood by Jim ‘Catfish’ Hunter and Andy Messersmith – not the reserve clause but free agency – set off the player salary escalation which reshaped baseball. In the face of predictions that big market teams would collect the best talent, parity emerged while the Yankees fell to consecutive losing seasons. But there began 25 years of labor strife. While concerned with New York – the author notes the Mets and the Yankees took decade-long turns in winning the metropolitan attendance battle, roughly corresponding with the teams’ playing success – the author omits discussing the abandonment of the first and second divisions in favor of East and West, and then into three groups as well as the introduction of inter-league play. Fetter’s treatment of the 2000 ‘blue ribbon’ panel on baseball is unconvincing; he does not understand equality of opportunity. The conclusion is tepid. An interesting book that does not quite deliver.
13. Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft (15 Aug 2018)
America’s founders underestimated civic virtue. Government is more likely to do justice if it aims to promote a moral citizenry. By ignoring ancient precepts of the Western political tradition, the US focuses on individualism to the detriment of society. Will surveys political philosophy and mid-20th century intellectual currents before making the positive case that ‘statecraft as soulcraft’ is necessary for the community’s cohesion. In the first regard, Will observes that Aristotle thought human nature provided a moral compass, which workings pointed to an orderly society. To accept natural law is to hold that individuals reach better decisions through common judgment. Decision making is a source of cohesion. Hobbes and Locke asserted the privacy of self-interest, rooted in human passions; Hobbes said reason is but a ‘spy’ for passion (contra Kant). In this view, decisions are a source of tension; society is held in check by tolerance; government is a referee. So oriented, moderns have further refocused natural law away from virtue and perfection toward regularity, away from duty toward rights. Turning to contemporary thought, Will demonstrates the leveling characteristics of Freudian psychology, relativism, the academy, and so on, while working his way back to Madison’s founding precept for the Constitution – factions holding one another in check as the ‘defect of better interests’. Madison was one-dimensional, in Will’s view, in thinking that passion trumped all. He shows that if rights rest on convention rather than natural law, then changes in opinion can change these rights. FDR, a social democrat, and Reagan, a Manchester liberal, were each moderns. Burke was the greatest contemporary to side with the ancients. The argument for soulcraft is overtly made with the assertion that the basic goal is not self-government but good government. Neither popularity nor tradition is by itself a guarantee of effectiveness; as regards the latter, this is the distinction between conservatism and reaction. Government promoting virtue is not a question of what to think but how to think. This points up the difference between soulcraft and (Nazi) totalitarianism, of natural law versus the Romantic will to power. But teaching cannot regard all outcomes as equal. Some questions (e.g., slavery) ought to be above the enthusiasms of popular sovereignty. Learned and soundly constructed, but suffers from too many asides and seeming changes of direction, which undermine concentration and depth. As an example, the observation that Plato thought Thucydides failed the first test of statesmanship, to improve the citizenry, ought to have featured in the conclusion, not early on.
1. Ward Farnsworth, Classical English Style (15 January 2022)
The selection of words, the arrangement of sentences, and cadence are primary determinants of classical English style. In contrast to catechism which seek to avoid mistakes via brevity, the author outlines patterns which create forceful prose.
• English is an amalgam of multi-syllable, formal Latin words and shorter, ‘common sense’ Saxon ones. Contrast is therefore readily achieved. Latin is frequently better for complex sentiments, Saxon for plain truth – particularly at the end of sentences. Alternately, Latinate for the false, Saxon for truth
• Express concrete metonyms (surrogate images) in Saxon, the associated abstraction in Latin. Again, movement between the two arrests attention
• Sentences expand ‘to the right’ when detail follows the predicate, and to the left when detail precedes. Expanding to the right creates a crush of action, to the left tension, mystery, surprise. Sometimes the preamble is the main point after all. Branching too can be paired for effect
• So too varied sentence length. One long sentence can support a succession of shorter ones. Also, sentences without adverbs will call attention to those with
• Rhetorical power is created by opposition and movement between poles; simplicity is overrated
• The passive voice gets the narrator / author ‘off the stage’
• Inviting the reader to try something (‘look for’, ‘show me’) enlists him in the author’s project
• Cadence, premised on the pattern of weak and strong syllables, is a way of training the reader’s expectations. A strong ending is decisive, a weak one can be a flourish, and so on
• Detail can add verisimilitude to hyperbolic claim or intent
Visions of the Kantian world-state
European nation-states survived 19th- and 20th-century ideologies (e.g., Marxism, racism) competing with Hobbesian sovereignty for the loyalty of citizens. World War I marked the high watermark of their cohesion. Visions of the Kantian world-state predominate.
Today, even more than in Hobbes’s time, sovereignty is commonly rejected as an expression of selfish particular interests, and today’s aspirations for political salvation have been invested in the power of international organizations.
Hobbes juxtaposed the demands of freedom against the passion for justice, and he lost. The most powerful enthusiasm of all has turned out to be the supposedly critical belief that our loyalties must not be constrained by the merely accidental fact of being born into some specific society. We must make our own judgments of rationality, and we may appeal beyond the state, to rights, international values, and external bodies. Modern democracy tends to play down the importance of sovereignty. Remarkably, however, it is in these European states, with their Hobbesian echo of pure statehood, that legality and decency survive, and to which the refugees move, in flight from a world that often seems to echo the state of nature Hobbes so much dreaded.
https://newcriterion.com/issues/2013/3/swimming-with-leviathan
14. Manville, Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens (28 Aug 2018)
Traces the evolution of Athenian citizenship in the late seventh and early sixth centuries. The Kleisthenian reforms catalyzed Attica’s transformation to a powerful democratic state. The author begins by sketching Aristotelian concepts of the polis and democracy: justice is the essential condition of the state, and citizens are shareholders in a company whose purpose is moral excellence. Poetry, archaeology, and other remnants of Ancient Athens demonstrate these ideas, but citizenship lacked precise, shared understanding. Kylon’s attempted coup d’etat in 630 provoked aristocratic defense of privilege, as well as Drakon’s subsequent codification of customs such as penalties for killing Athenians (versus foreigners). But interstate warfare played a greater role than socioeconomic factors; scarcity of land was more important in undermining tribal affiliations. The reforms of Solon initiated more precise ideals of membership, inheritance, immigration; he also canceled debt, thus ending the possibility of citizens being sold into slavery, which won many different adherents. Further, several of Solon’s laws transformed formerly private concerns such as marriage, orphanage, weights and measures, and public festivals into public concerns. Yet his foremost concern was the process of justice: the well-ordered society is the just society. His controversial policies, particularly the cancellation of debt, led to tripartite factional warfare and the dictatorship of Peisistratos. The overall effect of his 25-year rule was positive for democratization (a la Pinochet or Kirkpatrick). Then followed 510’s diapsephisis, the judgment of fitness for citizenship on the basis of tribal descent. Kliesthenes’ rise to power dispelled this reign of terror; further, good order became equal order. He revised definitions of citizenship and enhanced participation in the legal system, and his reforms benefitted from foreign threats. Citizens were encouraged to work together domestically and in warfare. The inclusion of anthropology elongates the study, relegating some interesting material to the footnotes. In all, a useful historical work.
15. Will, Bunts (8 Sep 2018)
A collection of baseball essays written over 1970-2000, reflecting on the sport’s seminal figures and movements, and how ‘America’s pastime’ reflects the country’s life. Games are a ‘space for ordered living’, according to Bart Giamatti, made not by nature but by free choices. Unlike football or basketball, baseball is played with a rhythm alternating between concentration and relaxation, as befits a 162-game season. Since teams will generally win and lose 40 percent of the time regardless, it’s the habit of the quotidian athletic performance that helps them achieve results in the balance – the thesis of
- Men at Work
. Donald Kagan denigrates the thesis as unheroic in a
- Public Interest
review republished herein; Will responds this is a Romantic fallacy, lionizing will without disciplined, sustained effort. (Elsewhere he comments that because sport compresses life’s trajectory, sports writers often display facile pathos.) As the author notes, the Greeks considered sport a moral undertaking: by witnessing grace, the soul learns to beauty, by seeing fair competition, the passions are educated. In ‘Good Character, Not Good Chemistry’, he sets forth the case against steroids (and other types of cheating). Winning is valued for praiseworthy attributes, while becoming better (self improvement) implies not only improvement but also the loneliness of the individual regimen. The purpose of umpiring is to regulate striving, not to eliminate violent effort but to regulate it, enabling excellence to prevail. Fans, for their part, are to derive enjoyment for the whole of the contest since pleasure cannot be predicated on outcomes (i.e., losing) that will so often be negative. Will often makes the case that the game has in fact improved. New York teams won 41 of 102 pennants from 1903-53, and 20 of 50 World Series, while there were no teams south of Washington DC or west of St. Louis, whereas since the fall of the reserve clause, very few teams have been repeat champions. As further evidence, he cites attendance: in strike-shortened 1995, 5 teams outdrew Cleveland’s record 2.6 million in 1948; average game attendance [probably tickets sold] in 1954 was 13,000. But the case mainly rests on the feats of the players, which are generally comparable – notwithstanding ‘live balls’, the introduction of the designated hitter, and steroids. There are sociopolitical essays on Jackie Robinson and Curt Flood, the former including the observation that Larry Doby may have been more important than Robinson because he was ‘merely’ talented (by comparison with the surreal Robinson). Will echoes the view that blacks are ‘underrepresented’ in baseball because of the game’s historic connotation with the color line – similar to rugby and apartheid – but does not observe that this helped opened the door to Latin Americans. On Pete Rose-Bart Giamatti, he writes that the important result was baseball’s institutions (i.e., the commissioner’s office) maintained its integrity rather than succumbing to supervision of federal judiciary. Less predictably, he is generally hard on owners during the labor turmoil of the 1990s. John Miller, then broadcasting for the Orioles and Washington DC layer Earl Bennett Williams, is lauded for attention to details: his ‘respect for listeners’ includes fastidious scorekeeping and absence of hyperbole. By contrast, Billy Martin (and Rose) is excoriated for violating baseball’s equipoise – he couldn’t sustain a winning culture. Some nuggets: the introduction of better fielding equipment in the 1880s change the game from a contest between fielder versus hitter to pitcher versus hitter, as prior to, 1 in 2 runs was unearned; players left gloves on the field through the 1940s; the Penn Law Review found the infield fly rule would be superfluous if baseball were to emulate cricket’s sporting ethic – but in America the purpose is to win; a winning team scores more runs in 1 inning than the loser does in 9; the end of the American League umpire’s chest protector lowered the strike zone, but the AL zone remained smaller than the National League’s. In all, the columns hold up well some 30 years later, and Will’s Aristotelian thesis (‘we are what we repeatedly do’) looks no worse for the wear either.
16. Oates, With Malice toward None (30 Sep 2018)
A learned but popular biography of Abraham Lincoln emphasizing the consistency of his vision of the American nation. As an Illinois Whig, Lincoln favored state-sponsored improvement (e.g., roads and technology improvement). He was an eloquent speaker when prepared but not a draftsman of note. Lincoln then served one term in Congress before returning to private pursuits, in which he was known as a railroad lawyer. His rivalry with Stephen Douglas commenced in the late 1830s, rising to its apex in opposing the Democrat’s notion of popular sovereignty, the fudge for extending slavery into the territories. Lincoln ran for the Senate in 1854 but conceded to a compromise candidate in order to keep a Democrat out, consistent with his view of cooperation for the common good. During this time, he appeared in New England and New York in support of fellow Whigs; in the wake of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and Scott decision, his decision to jump to the Republicans was a substantial boost for the new party. The famous 1858 debates with Dough elucidated his commitment to the federal union: Lincoln would respect slavery as established by law to preserve the union, but would not countenance expansion. 1860s’s split of the Democratic Party ushered Lincoln to the presidency, which occupies half of Oates’ work. Among the more interesting aspects are the decision to go to war, strong-armed tactics to keep Baltimore as well as the border states in the union, setting aside the fugitive slave law in the occupied south, and the struggle to find an offensive-minded general. Gradually, by 1862, he came to regard emancipation as a war aim, although he was conscious of running ahead of his cabinet, which insisted on a victory (Antietam) before the announcement, and more so popular opinion. Lincoln is presented as quirky, a hard worker and good decision maker, but not necessarily a first-grade Periclean leader. Does he deserve to be considered the redeemer of the Founding Fathers?