Design, by which the author principally means interactive design, is a question of problem solving rather than aesthetics. The book author provides practical yardsticks for assessing, hiring, and managing designers and design projects. In a digitizing era, it might further have addressed design’s relationship to strategy. Moderately caustic and salty, as befits Monteiro.
Book abstracts
9. Kagan, Thucydides (23 Mar 2015)
Critically reviews
- The History of the Peloponnesian War
to assess the validity of Thucydides’ account, with the broader goal of illuminating the Greek’s contribution to the discipline of history. Thucydides favored Pericles (as a worthy leader of Athens) and Nicias (as the general who tried to dissuade the hubristic public for invading Sicily), while scorning Cleon (as lucky at Sphacteria and for rejecting Sparta’s peace offer in 425). These views would have been contrary to popular understanding, therefore Thucydides is revisionist. Kagan also shows holes in Thucydides’ work, such as glossing the Megarian Decree. Thucydides fundamentally sought to get the story right, however, and in so doing established history as of men for men — eschewing divine intervention as explanatory — so that future generations would be able to learn from past affairs. Further, in focusing on politics, war, and statecraft, he narrowed Herodotus’ consideration of society and culture (seen today in Annalisme) and thus connected history to political philosophy, the pursuit of the best life for the whole of the citizenry. Superb conclusion.
23. Hill, Reformation to Industrial Revolution (18 Nov 2022)
Politics shaped England’s socioeconomic development over 1530-1780, as the island nation alone in Europe progressed from monarchy-and-aristocracy toward the proto-bourgeois, from agricultural toward commercial and early industrial.
In the Tudor era, the Commons gained influence; in the Reformation, absolutism was undermined by conscience and education of the gentry. London’s economic power acted to unify England (if not the soon-to-be United Kingdom). Domestic policy aimed at controlling the peasantry via justices of the peace. Foreign policy, which began in medieval thrall to Rome and Spain, grew to be independent (though the country remained a 2d-line power).
1640’s destruction of the Stuart bureaucracy was the most decisive event in British history. The dynasty’s unsustainable economics – spending more than it received – led to the Civil War (see also 18th-century France). But predictable causes do not guarantee predictable outcomes: nonconforming religion (e.g., Lollards) as well as the new urban culture evinced popular opposition. When the conflict came, richer peasants aligned not with the lumpen but the gentry, which had learned to lead in the schools.
During the Interregnum and Restoration, the abolition of northern and Welsh councils unified the legal system and the economic dominance of London gathered pace, acting to radiate Puritanism. But the Restoration’s key feature was anti-democratic. Aristocrats and bishops returned; nonconformists were excluded by the Clarendon Code; enclosure accelerated, promoting agricultural productivity. In this respect, Jacobitism was an outcome not a cause: unimproving, gentry and freeholders were liquidated; the ‘new men’ were ascendant before 1745. The Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660 marked the transition to national monopoly (i.e., to colonial mercantilism from chartered companies) and the Dutch wars. Then joint stock companies deployed capital where previously it had been in limited supply. (Ireland, after African slaves, was the principal victim of this trend.) The Restoration did not halt labor migration but favored employers. Excise and land taxes acted to shift resources from peasants to landowners and the City. Following the Toleration Act, Quakers and others saw to it that favorable legislation was enforced across England, again promoting more uniform administration and tempering the influence of JPs. Intellectually, the Newtonian revolution as well as dispersion of ‘natural hierarchy’ undermined views of social organization: men no longer were united to each other.
After the Glorious Revolution and over the 18th century the colonies supplanted Europe as England’s biggest market; 1763’s Peace of Paris converted these markets from suppliers to buyers, until the American revolution and Irish revolt shook the system. Thus there were five periods of export trade: old draperies to 1600; new draperies to 1650; colonial monopoly – entrepot – re-export to 1700; manufactures to the colonies to 1780; and afterward the industrial revolution, enabled by modernized banks and credit, facilitated worldwide export. Bacon’s aspirations for society advanced by scientific approaches advanced dissent. Freeborn men thought to enter the factor was to surrender their birthright; laborers now sought protection for Elizabethan regulations (e.g., prices, standards, apprenticeships, etc.). By 1780, rural distress was evident, though grand landowners had regained ground.
Heavily focused on structural analysis, there is no discussion of even the Whig Ascendancy or George III’s new system. Event are Whiggishly inevitable. The neo-Marxist approach also surrenders credibility in such observations as Soviet collectivization costs ‘thousands’ of lives.
10. Zimbalist, Circus Maximus (25 Mar 2015)
The Olympic Games and soccer’s World Cup nearly always fail to make good on promised economic benefits in both the short and long term. Bidding for monopolized products, egged on by ex ante predictions (rather than ex post studies) and those who stand to benefit from public works (e.g., contractors), and often competing with authoritarian subsidization, candidate cities jostle with one another and thereby overbid their means. IOC and FIFA requirements and corruption inflate the costs, which have been conclusively shown to outstrip revenues (and soft benefits) both on a short- and long-term basis — particularly when measured against the city’s next-best investment opportunity. Only Barcelona 1992, which fit the Summer Games into a long-term, post-Franco trajectory, has emerged without crippling debt and white elephants. Following a lull in interest from 1968-84, the Summer Games have been most popular but may now again be less desirable. Popular opinion in democratic societies is turning against the opportunity costs. Intended for a lay audience, the work is clear and definitive but somewhat repetitive.
11. Barraclough, Crucible of Europe (7 Apr 2015)
An overview of politics, war, and state-building in western Europe from 768, the accession of Karl der Grosse, to 1056, the death of the Holy Roman Empire’s Henry III. The German-speaking Merovingian Franks began consolidating the lands of France, Germany, and Italy, a process completed in 800, whereupon Carolingian society immediately lost its conquest-fueled dynamism, for commerce continued to lag Roman times, learning was limited to déclassé clerics, and government lacked centralizing power (often erroneously attributed to the missi dominci). It could not withstand the 9th-century raids of the Vikings, Turks, and Magyars, which accentuated the political division of Karl’s successors. In France, power devolved to the counts; in Italy, to city-states ruled by dukes; only in Germany did power remain monarchical — and of course in all cases the writ ran short. After the invasions crested with Otto I’s defeat of the Magyars at Lech in 955, the Saxons conquered Italy in 962 and so became the first Holy Roman Emperor, succeeding Karl and in contrast to the Byzantine monarchy. By the time of Henry’s passing a century later, however, a second medieval era arose. Present throughout both stages are rivalries among the crown, aristocratic classes, and church figures (both the papacy as well as the monasteries). Barraclough detours to contrast England’s contemporary development, prompted by Viking raids, in which the six rival kingdoms were consolidated and the country’s ‘ancient liberties’ ostensibly took root. Briskly synthesized and mostly readable, the work does contain whiff of progressivism to it: key elements are important for their contribution to the present day. Still, an excellent survey.
12. Zuckerts, Leo Strauss and the Problem of Political Philosophy (17 May 2015)
The challenge of political philosophy is to understand the best way to govern society. Leo Strauss’s reading of ancient and modern philosophers produced a master narrative, a history of ideas, featuring a ‘Socratic turn’ (when philosophy discarded the gods and began to focus on human nature and affairs) and a ‘Machiavellian turn’ (when the pursuit of virtue was lowered to accommodate how humans are commonly seen to behave). Positivism, which distinguishes between scientific fact and all other ‘values’, and historicism, which asserts ideas and events are chained to contemporary interpretation (and is now intertwined with postmodernism), threaten the tenets of this narrative because they tend to nihilism. The book features Strauss’s readings of leading figures and treats his practice of esotericism, which controversially asserts that many philosophers did not write what they really thought, but only left clues, due to threat of political persecution. A final section considers his practical politics and school of disciples. To be re-read.
13. Feld, Venture Deals (10 Jun 2015)
Economics and control are the primary features of a venture capital investment. The book surveys various mechanisms toward these objectives including the term sheet, the letter of intent, and frequently used but obscurantist clauses. The authors helpfully describe how funds work and stand (i.e., polished) modes of seeking funding. An excellent work.
14. Shlaes, Coolidge (28 Jul 2015)
A biography of the 30th American president, a famously taciturn New Englander. Mainly complete in its narrative – there are strands here are there which are left loose, such as an apparent estrangement from wife Grace during the latter years of his presidency or controversy regarding the removal of the president of his alma mater, Amherst — the book sufficiently describes why Coolidge acted as he did but lacks details as to how. As such, it’s difficult to decide what are his primary leadership qualities. Also filled with extraneous anecdotes, this is an average work.
15. Lowenstein, When Genius Failed (19 Aug 2015)
Narrates the spectacular rise and fall of Long Term Capital Management, 1993-98. The disgraced John Merriwether assembled former Salmon traders, leading academics, and investment capital into a quantitative, secretive hedge fund. Relying on models to reduce anticipable risk, leverage to magnify gains, and bravado to minimize trading costs, LTCM initially did so well as to return client funds, in order to trade entirely for its own benefit. The Russian default of 1998 exposed excessive faith in (low) probability of risk, and concentration of risk inherent in leverage, sending the firm spiraling toward bankruptcy. Because LTCM traded many bespoke instruments, many of Wall Street’s blue-chip firms were implicated as counterparties, threatening system malfunction. The Federal Reserve orchestrated a fraught bailout. Mostly brisk and dramatically told.
19. Butterfield, George III and the Historians (24 September 2022)
George III’s intentions at accession have been revealing of the historian’s partisanship and methodological preferences. Primarily narrating the historiographical turns of the succeeding two centuries, Butterfield points up the novelty of party in 18th-century England: the great minds of Bolingbroke, Hume, and Burke were innovating. Therefore to claim the king broke rules of constitutional monarchy which were not so well established in 1760 as in 1860 indicates anachronism. Further, both Whigs (Rockinghams) and court parties were necessary to conflict and resolution; one should not write history as if conflict should not have occurred. The role of independent MPs, not to mention the Wilkes saga, brings politics back into relief. Where Whiggish historians have seen partisan views (e.g., in parliamentary debates) as automatically leading to voting outcomes, Namierites have seen socioeconomic classification as determinative. (As an analogue, see historical treatment of assembly debates early in the early French Revolution.) Yet individuals acted on particular influences or preferences. No amount of scholarship can remedy insufficient imagination in interrogating and reconstructing the past. Equally, the historian who recovers structure and process is not obliged to defend it. The professional is to be diligent in search of evidence, responsible to it, and fair-minded in judgement and presentation. Narrative encompasses both analysis and structure most fully. Put more colloquially, the reader should not be able to guess the outcome.