Against populism in American conservatism

It seems the Republican party, that is the official (officious?) arbiter of American conservatism, is obliged to fight a two-front war:

What began in the twentieth century as an elite-driven defense of the classical liberal principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution ended up, in the first quarter of the twenty-first century, as a furious reaction against elites of all stripes. Many on the right embrace a cult of personality and illiberal tropes. The danger was that the alienation from an antagonism toward American culture and society expressed by many on the right could turn into a general opposition to the constitutional order. That temptation had been present in the writings of the Agrarians, in the demagogy of Tom Watson, Hue Long, and Father Charles Coughlin, in the conspiracies of Joseph McCarthy, in the racism of George Wallace, in the radicalism of

    Triumph

, in the sour moments of the paleo-conservatives, in the cultural despair of the religious right and in the rancid antisemitism of the alt-right. But it was cabined off off. It was contained. That would not be the case forever – as Trump and January 6, 2021 had shown.

15. Wood, Radicalism of the American Revolution (10 Aug 2017)

The American Revolution exhibited none of the socioeconomic conditions classically associated with political upheaval, yet was a time of thoroughgoing change. Spanning 1740-60s (i.e., before the French and Indian War) to the Jacksonian era, Wood narrates a series of transformations in colorful detail, emphasizing social phenomena. For example, vertical connections of patronage were replaced by egalitarianism, as paternal authority began melting away. Leisure became a suspect trait of residual aristocracy; property transformed from a source of authority to merely another economic interest. Superior virtue was seen to derive from common moral sense, sharpened by participating in society (not government), rather than educated reason. In this way, the emergent middle class fused the gentility of the upper class with the bona fides of the working class to create a distinctly American ‘moral hegemony’. In the economic sphere, commerce which had been predicated on trust (credit) became more purely transactional, while the colonial ‘trading society’ predicted on business with England grew aware of its internal market and thus potential self-sufficiency. Servitude — save for slavery — all but dissolved. In the Federalist era, the granting of private charters became commonplace, such that not every purpose was publicly oriented, thereby raising questions of property rights; so judges became arbiters of public power versus private rights. Politically, government office went from an obligation to a source of social standing. Proto-group rights (first manifest by anti-Federalists), replaced disinterest as the defining standard of decision making. Then the first avowed political parties gook hold as the expression of loyalty to common interest and advancement. The Jacksonian age further restored monarchical characteristics under the cloak of popular rhetoric, such as the spoils system. Wood concludes: the revolution was about deciding who are America’s proper sociopolitical leaders, elsewhere noting the founders died depressed as the new society zoomed past republicanism into democracy. Deeply researched, the author’s taste for anecdote works to crowd out military, economic, and political events (context). Oddly, there is little discussion of Turner’s social mobility in migration, nor much regional color — although the author displays humility in allowing the character of local histories will require adjustments to the main narrative. A major question left unanswered is why the resultant concentration of wealth and broader inequality did not foster increased political instability?

16. Cassirer, Rousseau, Goethe, Kant (16 Aug 2017)

The Enlightenment was equally a philosophical and empirical worldview — right thinking as a precursor to right action. Cassirer shows Kant appreciated Rousseau as the ‘Newton of the moral universe’. For example, Kant saw that Rousseau’s state of nature was important not because of its lost splendor but for what society should aspire to: the Swiss sought to revisit man’s natural state in order to identify ‘errors’ of contemporary society. Where Rousseau deduced this ideal, however, Kant (like Burke) saw civilization as the focal point of humanity, and declared the task of philosophy (i.e., defining what it is to be human) began from this point. They share a grounding in the priority of the individual’s rights, and saw conscience as the basis for appreciating God — not metaphysical proof. But where Rousseau is optimistic of man’s increasing happiness, Kant departed in holding that deeds not outcomes are the of final importance: existence is to prove humanity’s worthiness of freedom. Ultimately, Kant gave Rousseau’s conceptual work rigor. Conversely, in the second essay Cassirer shows how Kant’s empiricism established a basis for Goethe’s theoretical advances, such as metamorphosis, the process of becoming in nature. This bore fruit in the arts: both believed that genius give rules and form to creation; science is more beholden to experience, although the two differed on degree. Goethe concluded understanding doesn’t derive (a priori) from nature but is inspired by it. Separately, Kant held everything has value or worth. Value has a substitute, whereas worth is unique. That which is truly worth is borne of moral choices, which alone bear dignity.

17. Bennett and Miles, Riding Shotgun: Role of the COO (26 Aug 2017)

An academic study of a nebulous executive role, driven by identifying commonalities surfaced through interviews. There are several common models — ‘two in a box’, mentorship, divide and conquer (outside/inside), successor planning — any of which can work provided the model is agreed. Complementary skills and mutual trust, as well as ability to resolve decisions gracefully (with the benefit belong to the executive) are vital. The operating offer must balance the executive’s vision and the corporate strategy with delivering results.

18. Gay, Why the Romantics Matter (27 Aug 2017)

The Romantics located the source of artistic passion in ‘bold subjectivity’, the celebration of individual idiosyncrasy. The movement initially sought for inspiration in erotic love (France), God (Germany), and nature (England), but at its height in the four decades around the turn of the 20th century, the self predominated. The movement was aided by the rise of Western leisure and middlemen / taste makers, and paradoxically was first to scorn the bourgeois that supported new styles in art, literature, drama, and so on. Using a seemingly dated lens, Gay frequently refers to Freud as a kind of Greek chorus, psychoanalysis being a tool for revealing man’s secrets. If art is unconcerned with virtue, why be concerned with art?

19. Ramadan, Islam: The Essentials (8 Sep 2017)

Ostensibly a theological overview, the book reads as a plea for reformist Islam against literalist and traditionalist schools. A preliminary historical sketch emphasizes the ‘pragmatic’ character of military conquest by Mohammed and his early successors, in keeping with the ‘fellowship’ of Islam among Judaism and Christianity. As tradition set in — Sunni gained a reputation for deriving authority from the people, Shi’a from elites — Islam exhibited a crisis of confidence as early as the 12th century. By the 19th, as colonialism entered even the holy lands, Islam became a symbol of resistance to Western values, in which literalism sharpened the contrast. The emphasis became unique rules and mores, sometimes evidencing the sociocultural traits of Arab, Turk, or Persian people rather than the ethics of the Koran. (Ironically, during the early modern period it was seen as sensual and permissive.) The author acknowledges Islamic societies fall short of cosmopolitan, if not to say progressive, socioeconomic standards. Formalism has all but banished critical thinking needed by democracy; but the causes are said to be temporal, worldly; he does not confront so-called political Islam’s descent to terrorism. Islam needs widespread education in legalistic analysis of the Koran — a tall order; ultimately it may instead require a charismatic, peaceful figure such as Martin King. Useful as an overview, engaging during parts of the second half, limited as a sociopolitical solution.

20. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam (14 Sep 2017)

An extended essay on the place of Islam in the global sphere, generally recurring to three themes: sources and consequences of theocracy, Islam’s historical relationship with the West, and Islam in the 20th and 21st centuries. In contrast to Judeo-Christianity, Islam can be seen as a religion subdivided into nations; Christian clergy haven’t enjoyed equivalent social authority in at least three centuries. There are chiefly two political traditions, quietism in authoritarian society and radical activism, both borne of Mohammed’s life (and of course several schools of legal interpretation). As regards the West, the Crusades were unimportant to contemporary Ottomans. The end of the expansionary era (as marked by Lepanto and Vienna) was more significant. Most important, Islam was already superseded by European technological and economic progress, such as Atlantic maritime trade, and well closed to foreign intellectual currents — since the 9th century, only 100,000 Western books have been translated in Arabic, the equivalent of a year’s production in Spain. Muslims never saw their expansion as imperial, but in the modern era, which began with the coming of Napoleon, fundamentalism has required an enemy. In 20th-century Arabia, Wahhabism allied to Saudi nationalism presented themselves as keepers of the holy land; with the decline of pan Arabism — only Palestine didn’t succeed in creating a nation-state — nationalism and fundamentalism have blurred. The Iranian revolution was a fundamentalist coup d’etat, and the author asserts the hostage crisis was a response to improving US ties. Similarly, first Sadat’s accord and then the collapse of the USSR forced Palestinians to talk with Israel. Latterly, terrorist bombings violate the Islamic prohibition against suicide (which is not proof of martyrdom), more evidence that fundamentalism has come to ignore its origins.

21. Finnegan, Barbarian Days (9 Oct 2017)

A robust telling of the author’s surfing from Bohemian youth through expatriate life to escapades from New York. Finnegan grew up in northern Los Angeles and the east side of Oahu in the 1950s and 60s before heading to UC Santa Cruz, then dropping out to surfari in Hawaii, the Polynesian islands (where he discovered Tavarua), and Australia. All along, he read and wrote extensively while learning to interview locals, developing an approachable, conversational style and a leftist worldview. In Cape Town, he parlayed a chance post teaching black students into ‘frontline’ journalism, substantially launching his career. Most relatable is four years during the mid 80s in San Francisco among the ‘Doc’ Renneker crowd. But frequent surf-induced delinquency, as well as his partner’s ambitions, induced his move to metropolitan New York to become a full-time writer for the

    New Yorker

— relegating surfing to big-wave sojourns in Madeira and smash-and-grab trips around the Tri State area. Finnegan writes lucidly and patiently about wave features, making the book accessible to novices. I disagree with the assertion that surfing paradoxically combines desire to be alone with desire to perform — solace or at least friendship wins out — but enjoy the idea (attributed to Norman Mailer) that exercise without excitement, competition, or danger doesn’t strengthen the body but wears it out. Not because my own experience of exercise is weariness but as I have enjoyed training with a purpose.

22. Jones, Burke and the Invention of Modern Conservatism (22 Oct 2017)

A problematic monograph studying Edmund Burke’s establishment as founder of British conservatism. Burke’s supple yet vociferous politics left the Georgian / early Victorians to decide whether he was a great statesman and who were his heirs: neither the Whigs nor the Tories could claim the whole of him, Peel and Disraeli making no overt appeals to his legacy. So too were they unsure of his Irish heritage. By mid century, however, in part because his contrasting the English constitution with French tumult, he was seen as a conservative genius — the author ignores Blackstone or Bagehot! — while Matthew Arnold and others acclaimed him a literary prodigy. Later, he became generally fashionable as an aphorist, a kind of Mark Twain. Amid constitutional reform of the 1860s, Liberals couldn’t accept his prior opposition; however, revisionist appraisals by Leslie Stephens and especially John Morley helped bring him into the Irish Home Rule debate of the 1880s. Gladstone was his foremost Liberal supporter, the Liberal Unionists used him the most. The author asserts Irish conflict, in combination with the Unionists transition to the Tories, was the turning point. When it became evident the Liberals would not reconcile, the question of who truly succeeded Burke reached its final phase, ironically echoing the split between Fox and Burke over the French Revolution. Yet there were two additional dynamics at work. Burke’s oeuvre was reduced to body of political theory, notably by Hugh Cecil, son of Lord Salisbury, in which he was recognized as a pioneer of applying historical method in deriving just politics. Separately, he was widely studied in schools as a paradigm of English rhetoric as well as the English state (in contradistinction to the French Revolution). Sensibly organized but poorly written and occasionally conceptually muddy, the work is irredeemably undermined by both a rushed ‘epilogue’ citing a David Bromwich quote as evidence Burke is not in fact at conservative at all, and more importantly failing to deliver on the title’s promise, British political conservatism being nowhere treated in the whole.

23. Meacham, Destiny and Power (7 Nov 2017)

A political biography of George HW Bush, emphasizing his ethic of public service, conciliatory politics, and establishmentarian approach to foreign affairs. Bush was a decent man and more effective than contemporaries recognized. The biography portrays his Connecticut family’s blue blood, in which sports was a measure of character, and points up his unusual pursuit of becoming a naval aviator prior to attending college. But details of his largely independent success as a Texas oil man are sparse, as the author rushes onto Bush’s nascent political career. Reaching Washington’s upper echelon over the course of the 1960s, Bush was loyal to Nixon as he would be to Reagan — even though he was seen as a good loser. (How significant really was his rivalry with Donald Rumsfeld?) As president, he is credited with skillfully managing the Cold War’s denouement, the Iraq war, and the coup against Gorbachev. Yet despite tick-tock details supplemented by deep access to primary materials — diaries and interviews — Meacham unsatisfactorily characterizes the political revolution of 1981-92. Therefore he is less skillful in attributing the cause of Clinton’s surprise electoral win: was it poor campaigning, sociopolitical change, or something more? (The irony of Clinton’s draft dodging, in comparison with Bush’s service, is unremarked.) Ultimately, the work reads as a consensus view of America’s (Democratic) establishment from the safety of a quarter century.