25. Talbot, Season of the Witch (28 Dec 2025)

Valorizes libertine, gay San Francisco circa 1965-85 as a Nietzschean escapade-cum-morality tale, flattening socioeconomic context and ignoring externalities. Whether or no these were the city’s animating spirits, Talbot reads as though the late 20th century’s progressive paradigm was inevitable rather than contingent on events that also included neighborhood reshuffling after 1989’s earthquake and the Internet boom of the next decade. Equally, why and at what cost should counterculture be not merely accepted but endorsed?

Narrating via sympathetic character sketch of local celebrities and leftist politicians, Talbot moves from Haight-Ashbury bohemians to Filmore’s music scene to city hall. The Sixties amounted to a cultural dialogue between metropolitan London, falling fast, and a depopulating northern California city of approximately 725,000, supported by Motown Detroit. Music, fashion, drugs, and sex surpassed the civil rights movement, welfare-state expansion, declining industrial and Keynesian economics, or the Cold War (save Vietnam).

Like other US cities, San Francisco’s wartime and postwar industrial heights were passing, families migrating to the suburbs (their commute aided by the unmentioned 1972 debut of BART), and violent crime rising. Talbot alludes to working-class neighborhoods, portrays the police as a corrupt, closed ‘Gaelic and garlic’ shop, and paints felonies in the colors of moral equivalence. Municipal administration improves with the election of George Moscone, trailed by the beatified Harvey Milk – both complicit in Jim Jones’ degradation of electoral politics. Amid the Dan White’s notorious assassinations, one learns the Board of Supervisors somehow remained a 6-5 majority of ‘moderates’. Who were these benighted voters? Why is Dianne Feinstein, quarterback to 1981’s $25 million bailout by California and praised for prompting a conference of American mayors to establish an AIDS task force, a ‘good government moderate’?

The 1950s are ‘dark days’ for labor activists. Reagan is seen to put a ‘genial face on callous policies’ as governor in the 1960s and president in the 1980s, when the city heroically responded to AIDs (originally GRID). The underdog 49ers are most laudable for being gay-friendly, unlike the hegemonic Dallas Cowboys, whose Hall of Fame but Christian coach exhibits an equally regional trait. And so on.

Talbot questionably reports Vincent Hallinan, an early hero, has an Olympic-size swim pool in his Marin backyard – most unlikely. Later one reads 15 percent of returning Vietnam veterans were addicted to heroin, without citation. Oral history without reference to other evidence, however readable, seems to sacrifice accuracy and balance.

Cities are ‘social enterprises built on the tacit compact that one racial or religious group or neighborhood won’t start warring on another’, Talbot writes. On what basis do they function well? He ventures:
By taking care of suffering men [during the AIDS crisis], San Francisco finally became a unified city. …The plague burned down to the city’s core, where one simple truth was revealed: we must take care of each other. No matter how sick or helpless or untouchable people are.

The contemporary left transforms Hobbesian individuals into Marxist/postmodern classes, whose claims are borne not of natural right but Rousseau’s compassion, demanding not only toleration but approbation. How to meet the costs of such as regime? The burdens of California’s Proposition 13, its latter-day capital-gains tax, and other scarcities endemic to the peninsular city disproportionately fall not on patricians like Feinstein or nouveau riches but working classes and families, the citizens who seemingly comprise Talbot’s ‘conservatives’.

Even as a cultural synthesis of how it felt to contemporaries, Season assumes that which is to be explained: that which might have been grounded in San Francisco’s up-and-down 150 years since the 1840s, or contrasted with contemporary American cities, is lionized in isolation. Season may serve as a standard treatment not as a treatment of any standard.

3. Anderson, Revolution (23 February 2025)

Inspired by recovering individual liberty and market economics as well as the need for a strong military, the Reagan presidency amounted to a revolutionary restoration of American government, lifting the United States to the brink of winning the Cold War – albeit not before recovering from the Iran-contra affair.

The three fundamental issues of American politics are peace, prosperity, and individual liberty. The core of the 1980 presidential campaign, from Anderson’s vantage as policy and economics chief, were economic policy (i.e., tax), energy, and foreign policy and defense. Reagan saw a thriving economy and strong military (i.e., anti-Soviet foreign policy including the Strategic Defense Initiative) as imperatives; the latter was not a contingency but an absolute requirement. The arms race was one-sided, the US held back by elite opinion. Declining Soviet economics were accelerated by falling oil prices, China’s conversion to market economics, and American missile defense, which together forced Russia to choose between guns and butter. Whereas an improving US economic would alleviate the same dilemma.

In August 1980, economic forecasters including the Congressional Budget Office showed tax revenue for the next five years would increase faster than government expense. By 1985, there would be a $45 billion surplus; but the $55 billion deficit in 1981 was a campaign liability. Reagan’s October 1976 op-ed calling for reexamination of Harding and Kennedy supply-side tax cuts was the closest he came to claiming cuts would instantly yield more revenue. Tax cuts resulted in the wealthy carrying a large share of the burden.

In the 1960s-80s, new policy ideas came from universities, think tanks, publishing houses, and news media. Milton Friedman is the economic hero; reforming the regulatory state was a major component of economic policy. For Anderson, public service was a duty, but working at Hoover was preferable.

Cabinet councils, informal work groups for interrelated – but not government-wide – issues were highly effective. The use of advisory boards was invaluable for presenting outside views to the president. In foreign policy, advisors are more critical than in domestic affairs because matters are less subject to public knowledge and scrutiny. In Reagan’s second term, Baker, Meese, Kirkpatrick, and Deaver were out of the picture, while Bush was ineffective. Bill Casey is the villain: his sins included Iran-contra as well as dismantling PFLAB. Iran-contra reinforced that trading with terrorists is a very poor strategy: the terrorists will always return for more. Producing intelligence should always be separate from setting policy (consuming it).

Management under Reagan featured establishing strategic priorities, changing tactics as warranted, delegating aggressively, and negotiating from overstated starting points. In elaborating Reagan’s strategy of asking for 200 percent of the objective, he defends Baker’s work as chief of staff. Nixon’s mismanaging personnel selection crippled his presidency, a mistake Reagan was conscious to avoid.