Inspired by recovering individual liberty and market economics as well as the need for a strong military, the Reagan presidency amounted to a revolutionary restoration of American government, lifting the United States to the brink of winning the Cold War – albeit not before recovering from the Iran-contra affair.
The three fundamental issues of American politics are peace, prosperity, and individual liberty. The core of the 1980 presidential campaign, from Anderson’s vantage as policy and economics chief, were economic policy (i.e., tax), energy, and foreign policy and defense. Reagan saw a thriving economy and strong military (i.e., anti-Soviet foreign policy including the Strategic Defense Initiative) as imperatives; the latter was not a contingency but an absolute requirement. The arms race was one-sided, the US held back by elite opinion. Declining Soviet economics were accelerated by falling oil prices, China’s conversion to market economics, and American missile defense, which together forced Russia to choose between guns and butter. Whereas an improving US economic would alleviate the same dilemma.
In August 1980, economic forecasters including the Congressional Budget Office showed tax revenue for the next five years would increase faster than government expense. By 1985, there would be a $45 billion surplus; but the $55 billion deficit in 1981 was a campaign liability. Reagan’s October 1976 op-ed calling for reexamination of Harding and Kennedy supply-side tax cuts was the closest he came to claiming cuts would instantly yield more revenue. Tax cuts resulted in the wealthy carrying a large share of the burden.
In the 1960s-80s, new policy ideas came from universities, think tanks, publishing houses, and news media. Milton Friedman is the economic hero; reforming the regulatory state was a major component of economic policy. For Anderson, public service was a duty, but working at Hoover was preferable.
Cabinet councils, informal work groups for interrelated – but not government-wide – issues were highly effective. The use of advisory boards was invaluable for presenting outside views to the president. In foreign policy, advisors are more critical than in domestic affairs because matters are less subject to public knowledge and scrutiny. In Reagan’s second term, Baker, Meese, Kirkpatrick, and Deaver were out of the picture, while Bush was ineffective. Bill Casey is the villain: his sins included Iran-contra as well as dismantling PFLAB. Iran-contra reinforced that trading with terrorists is a very poor strategy: the terrorists will always return for more. Producing intelligence should always be separate from setting policy (consuming it).
Management under Reagan featured establishing strategic priorities, changing tactics as warranted, delegating aggressively, and negotiating from overstated starting points. In elaborating Reagan’s strategy of asking for 200 percent of the objective, he defends Baker’s work as chief of staff. Nixon’s mismanaging personnel selection crippled his presidency, a mistake Reagan was conscious to avoid.