Presents leading segments of Burke’s most notable works in conjunction with contemporary critiques, and reprints three essays seeking to characterize the whole of his thinking. Kramnick succeeds in simultaneously portraying the genius of Burke’s rhetoric (if not the volume of his erudition) and its more heated qualities, which sometimes took him beyond the pale. The triumvirate of essays – 1 right, 1 Marxist, and 1 centrist — demonstrate Burke’s empirical skepticism toward rationalism.
Edmund Burke
5. Stanlis, Edmund Burke (10 Apr 2016)
Burke’s understanding of natural law — the spirit of equity — as reflected in English common law is the cornerstone of his largely uncodified body of thought: so Stanlis has contended since his groundbreaking Edmund Burke and the Natural Law. In this monograph, he reiterates and elaborates the basis of those views, while demonstrating he was not a utilitarian. Subsequently he shows Burke’s opposition to the rationalist views of the Enlightenment, particularly the French philosophe Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose conception of ‘sensibility’, or abstract moral empathy, which paves the wave for theoretical innovation; Burke preferred an empirical approach to limited reform, in order to preserve the best elements of society. This contrast between revolution and reform is demonstrated in Burke’s view of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, a revolution ‘not made but prevented’.
22. Jones, Burke and the Invention of Modern Conservatism (22 Oct 2017)
A problematic monograph studying Edmund Burke’s establishment as founder of British conservatism. Burke’s supple yet vociferous politics left the Georgian / early Victorians to decide whether he was a great statesman and who were his heirs: neither the Whigs nor the Tories could claim the whole of him, Peel and Disraeli making no overt appeals to his legacy. So too were they unsure of his Irish heritage. By mid century, however, in part because his contrasting the English constitution with French tumult, he was seen as a conservative genius — the author ignores Blackstone or Bagehot! — while Matthew Arnold and others acclaimed him a literary prodigy. Later, he became generally fashionable as an aphorist, a kind of Mark Twain. Amid constitutional reform of the 1860s, Liberals couldn’t accept his prior opposition; however, revisionist appraisals by Leslie Stephens and especially John Morley helped bring him into the Irish Home Rule debate of the 1880s. Gladstone was his foremost Liberal supporter, the Liberal Unionists used him the most. The author asserts Irish conflict, in combination with the Unionists transition to the Tories, was the turning point. When it became evident the Liberals would not reconcile, the question of who truly succeeded Burke reached its final phase, ironically echoing the split between Fox and Burke over the French Revolution. Yet there were two additional dynamics at work. Burke’s oeuvre was reduced to body of political theory, notably by Hugh Cecil, son of Lord Salisbury, in which he was recognized as a pioneer of applying historical method in deriving just politics. Separately, he was widely studied in schools as a paradigm of English rhetoric as well as the English state (in contradistinction to the French Revolution). Sensibly organized but poorly written and occasionally conceptually muddy, the work is irredeemably undermined by both a rushed ‘epilogue’ citing a David Bromwich quote as evidence Burke is not in fact at conservative at all, and more importantly failing to deliver on the title’s promise, British political conservatism being nowhere treated in the whole.
19. Pappin, Metaphysics of Edmund Burke (12 Oct 2019)
Burke’s political thought, while lacking a complete metaphysics, tracks the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition even though he is fundamentally an English empiricist. His foremost contribution is a theory of change within a hierarchic, teleological universe: ‘By preserving the method of nature in the conduct of the state, in what we improve, we are never wholly new; in what we retain, we are never wholly obsolete’, he wrote in Reflections. The best synthesis is in Thoughts on Our Present Discontents: ‘It is the business of the speculative philosopher to mark the proper ends of government. It is the business of the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out the proper means towards those ends, and to employ them with effect’. Pappin begins by dismissing claims of Burke’s utilitarianism as language for rhetorical effect; elsewhere, he denies Burke is an existentialist or a reactionary, for his views are neither a ‘swirl of abstraction’ nor premised on defending an unchanging order. The balance of the book sketches the metaphysical principles of Aristotle, Aquinas, and to a lesser degree Jacques Maritain (i.e., Collingwood’s absolute presuppositions). Action follows nature; action and existence require structure and essence; growth is essential for the subject to reach its teleological ends; wisdom perfects the intellect as virtue the will. For Burke as for Aquinas, social (secondary) nature is shaped by habits and customs that naturally emerge from man’s primary nature. In Economical Reform, ‘It would be wise to attend upon the order of things, and not to attempt to outrun the slow, but smooth and even course of nature’. In a volume of his writings, ‘Man is made for speculation and action, and when he pursues his nature he succeeds best at both’. Where contemporary philosophers posit the rejection of metaphysical essence liberates man, Burke unites change and constancy, possibility and structure. Thus man’s place is within the social community, not bound but prudentially circumscribed in his behavior. Ultimately, Burke distinguishes between abstraction and universal / absolute and so contends that society’s proper ends are realized according to unique characteristics of the epoch. Pappin asserts Burke should have given more thought to metaphysics but concedes his primary purpose was political. The work is carefully organized and helpfully illustrates metaphysical concepts, but the prose is choppy. While the natural law view of Burke is often referenced, where is Harvey Mansfield? Coda: another Burke quote: ‘All men have equal rights but not to equal things’.
22. Jones, Burke and the Invention of Modern Conservatism (22 Oct 2017)
A problematic monograph studying Edmund Burke’s establishment as founder of British conservatism. Burke’s supple yet vociferous politics left the Georgian / early Victorians to decide whether he was a great statesman and who were his heirs: neither the Whigs nor the Tories could claim the whole of him, Peel and Disraeli making no overt appeals to his legacy. So too were they unsure of his Irish heritage. By mid century, however, in part because his contrasting the English constitution with French tumult, he was seen as a conservative genius — the author ignores Blackstone or Bagehot! — while Matthew Arnold and others acclaimed him a literary prodigy. Later, he became generally fashionable as an aphorist, a kind of Mark Twain. Amid constitutional reform of the 1860s, Liberals couldn’t accept his prior opposition; however, revisionist appraisals by Leslie Stephens and especially John Morley helped bring him into the Irish Home Rule debate of the 1880s. Gladstone was his foremost Liberal supporter, but the Liberal Unionists used him the most. The author asserts Irish conflict, in combination with the Unionists transition to the Tories, was the turning point. When it became evident the Liberals would not reconcile, the question of who truly succeeded Burke reach its final phase, ironically echoing the split between Fox and Burke over the French Revolution. Yet there were two additional dynamics at work. Burke’s oeuvre was reduced to body of political theory, notably by Hugh Cecil, son of Lord Salisbury, in which he was recognized as a pioneer of applying historical method in deriving just politics. Separately, he was widely studied in schools as a paradigm of English rhetoric as well as the English state (in contradistinction to the French Revolution). Sensibly organized but poorly written and occasionally conceptually muddy, the work is irredeemably undermined by both a rushed ‘epilogue’ citing a David Bromwich quote as evidence Burke is not in fact at conservative at all, and more importantly failing to deliver on the title’s promise, British political conservatism being nowhere treated in the whole.
22. Kirk, Edmund Burke: A Genius Reconsidered (29 Nov 2019)
Narrates the life and elucidates the political legacy of Edmund Burke, whose views on constitutional government, political party, and sociopolitical reform are fundamental to Western civic heritage. Though lacking the élan of Rousseau or Johnson, Burke’s wisdom pertains in the mid-20th century. Drawing on numerous Burke scholars, Kirk makes particular use of Peter Stanlis’ summary of Burke’s objectives:
- To maintain the structure of the British state
- To define the limits of British monarchy
- To extend the role of the House of Commons
- To expound the role of the political party
- To extend civil rights and economic opportunities to all citizens, including throughout the Empire (according local custom)
- To defend the historical traditions and order of Europe (i.e., Greco-Christian West) versus the Enlightenment
- To solve problems (i.e., to do justice) with an eye to custom (often ‘prudence’) and equally the ethics of prevailing legal norms
As early as 1746, Burke worried that decadent Western elites would succumb to leveling rationalism. As a parliamentarian, his initial impact owed to advocating self-government in Ireland and America, restraint of the British monarch (‘economy’) and simultaneously promotion of the political party, and social justice in India. His moral imagination and literary genius revealed his approach: ability to reform, disposition to preserve. Thoughts on Our Present Discontents first propounded the role of party harnessed to national interest (i.e., accountability to the public), because rising ‘popular interests’ would no longer abide conventional monarchy or aristocracy; but party needed to surmount the taint of faction. Burke always opposed arbitrary power and so the turn to opposing Jacobinism evidenced his recognizing rationalism’s inciting a European civil war. Reflections on the Revolution in France demonstrated the natural ends of Enlightenment government: the destructive energy of all radicals and the insistence on absolute submission to will. Contesting the notion that Burke ‘gave to party what was intended for mankind’, Kirk shows Burke’s political philosophy in fact formed the initial and most enduring defense of Western civilization. Meanwhile, the defection of the Old Whigs to the Tories created the first and oldest political party (contra Jones, Invention of Modern Conservatism). Elsewhere Kirk is concerned to demonstrate Leo Strauss’ misreading, in Natural Right and History, of fatalism: though seeming to concede he could do no more, in fact Burke’s works during the 1790s anticipate Churchill in locating perseverance in the English public and rallying them to it. Valuable as one of the clearer biographies, Kirk settled the debate over whether Burke was a conservative.
7. Courtney, Montesquieu and Burke (11 Apr 2020)
Montesquieu deeply influenced Burke, particularly regarding the parliamentarian’s understanding of the British constitution and application of history. While sharing common views of l’esprit generale (roughly, sociological characteristics which interact with a country’s laws), the legislator (a representative not a delegate), and natural law (a superstructure for l’esprit), Burke’s outstanding debt consists of applying the Frenchman’s methods in a partisan way. From Montesquieu, Burke learned to derive a people’s nature from geographic, sociological, and historical events and used it to craft Rockingham ‘propaganda’ in political disputes over the American rebellion, Indian governance and the Hastings trial, and George III’s role in politics. Burke’s rationalizations do not rise to the level of political thought. But the era’s constitutional struggles particularly trouble this interpretation. Montesquieu’s identifying British separation of powers proved popular for articulating the outcome of 17th-century politics. Burke, an early enthusiast, opposed George’s capacity to influence Parliament and contended (in 1782) the crown’s power should be limited to appearance. Courtney observes the monarch conformed with the letter of the law, but elsewhere he says Burke bridged from Montesquieu to Bagehot’s 19th-century understanding. Further, he allows Reflections on the Revolution in France indeed rose to the level of political thought: Burke skillfully enunciated commonly held views or showed the way back to classical views. (In this, Courtney anachronistically calls Burke conservative.) The author holds to Namier’s view of individual behavior being explicable by classifiable political types, and the broad sweep of events corresponding to this structure, so to concede Burke’s originality is to undermine his presuppositions. Courtney also seems unhappy Burke moved on from considering history a repository of ‘scientific laws’ to a storehouse of the wisdom of precedent, and that he articulated principles for making these accessible.
1. Freeman, Edmund Burke and the Critique of Political Radicalism (10 Jan 2021)
Attempts a comprehensive critique of Burke’s view of radical theory and revolution, considering the parliamentarian’s work from the philosophic perspectives of metaphysics, epistemology, sociopolitical theory, and so on. The effort is enlightening but ultimately fails: Burke sought practical results not theoretic coherence. He saw that although public evil might stem from rulers or their agents, you cannot cure it by abolishing power, and that revolution always leads from anarchy to tyranny (i.e., restored order).
Burke held the political universe is orderly because it is a component of nature, so to revolt is to oppose nature. Reason is sovereign, but divorced from experience it’s dangerous. Therefore Burke’s metaphysics belongs to classical (rationalist) natural law but his epistemology is empiricist, Freeman says, adding that for Burke experience tended to prevail over prescription and further his metaphysics ‘collapsed’ as the French Revolution persisted. But: strictly scientific experience leads to bad politics, since social knowledge does not operate and proceed as scientific knowledge.
Diving deeper into sociology, Burke differed from Locke, who thought society’s purpose is to protect natural rights, in thinking that it is to improve social knowledge, wealth, and morality. His means of enforcement were Hobbesian and gravitated to aristocratic (i.e., meritocratic) order, accepting the possibility of pathologies because the alternative (revolution dispensing with circumstances of social advantages) was worse. Such sociology is said to contend with metaphysics, the latter seeing ideas and society forming over time, the former shaped by circumstance. The more important point is incrementalism versus sudden change: skepticism undermines order, fanaticism (to principle) kills it. The intellectual, Burke said, tends to land on solutions too big for the problem because there are no practical consequences, on principles in a vacuum.
The real rights of man are to live in freedom under the law, and a give law should be reformed iff it is working against its ends, not solely because outcomes are unequal. Again, ideology corrodes historical, socially understood, imperfect rights. In a cost-benefit analysis, present conditions outweighs speculation on future effects precisely because they already exists, just as natural morality surpasses dry reason.
Burke distinguishes between reform and revolution as well as change and progress. He foresees the ongoing need for adjustments. Radicalism aims at ideals which can never accommodate all circumstances; rebellion attacks constitutions outright, creating anarchy then tyranny. However, revolution is justified by tyranny and necessity (due to burdens imposed by tyranny), a point at which the people’s rights supersede the state’s interest in order. Revolution may be caused by weak, overly strong, or unwise government, and an interventionist state is more susceptible to revolt because it has put itself in a position to be held responsible for social problems. Conspiracy along is insufficient for a successful revolt. In the French Revolution one sees other necessary conditions: fashionable theory absorbed into the royal court; irresponsible, attenuated ruling classes; and long-term social changes such as economic growth, Enlightenment ideas, and new social classes. (An aside: Freeman several times accuses Burke of fearing social mobility; Burke thought talent should be seasoned.) The monarchy, having depredated the aristocracy, left itself to face the revolutionary will to power, masquerading as good-willed social reform, on its own. That is, when ruling principles are weak, people turn to counter-elites.
Burke’s theory is sometimes incoherent but superior to modern views, Freeman concludes, in going beyond cause to forecast course and consequences. The central contradiction is between tenets of aristocratic state (i.e., order) and bourgeois civil society (the engine of social change). Yet Freeman overlooks Burke distinction between progress and change. Real problems are solved by limited redress.
19. Pappin, Metaphysics of Edmund Burke (12 Oct 2019)
Burke’s political thought, while lacking a complete metaphysics, tracks the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition even though he is fundamentally an English empiricist. His foremost contribution is a theory of change within a hierarchic, teleological universe: ‘By preserving the method of nature in the conduct of the state, in what we improve, we are never wholly new; in what we retain, we are never wholly obsolete’, he wrote in Reflections. The best synthesis is in Thoughts on Our Present Discontents: ‘It is the business of the speculative philosopher to mark the proper ends of government. It is the business of the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out the proper means towards those ends, and to employ them with effect’. Pappin begins by dismissing claims of Burke’s utilitarianism as language for rhetorical effect; elsewhere, he denies Burke is an existentialist or a reactionary, for his views are neither a ‘swirl of abstraction’ nor premised on defending an unchanging order. The balance of the book sketches the metaphysical principles of Aristotle, Aquinas, and to a lesser degree Jacques Maritain (i.e., Collingwood’s absolute presuppositions). Action follows nature; action and existence require structure and essence; growth is essential for the subject to reach its teleological ends; wisdom perfects the intellect as virtue the will. For Burke as for Aquinas, social (secondary) nature is shaped by habits and customs that naturally emerge from man’s primary nature. In Economical Reform, ‘It would be wise to attend upon the order of things, and not to attempt to outrun the slow, but smooth and even course of nature’. In a volume of his writings, ‘Man is made for speculation and action, and when he pursues his nature he succeeds best at both’. Where contemporary philosophers posit the rejection of metaphysical essence liberates man, Burke unites change and constancy, possibility and structure. Thus man’s place is within the social community, not bound but prudentially circumscribed in his behavior. Ultimately, Burke distinguishes between abstraction and universal / absolute and so contends that society’s proper ends are realized according to unique characteristics of the epoch. Pappin asserts Burke should have given more thought to metaphysics but concedes his primary purpose was political. The work is carefully organized and helpfully illustrates metaphysical concepts, but the prose is choppy. While the natural law view of Burke is often referenced, where is Harvey Mansfield? Coda: another Burke quote: ‘All men have equal rights but not to equal things’.