Imperialism

18. Biggar, Colonialism (23 August 2024)

by kurto

The British empire evidenced both good and evil, defying the simplistic judgements of leftist critics. Imperialism, so far from being an ideological ‘project’, was more a race to catch up with trading and settlement. After the American Revolution, British society converted to antislavery: the Colonial Office’s intentions were Christian and humanitarian, above all dedicated to eradicating slavery and instilling such characteristic institutions as parliamentary accountability, a free press, and independent courts. Though detractors frequently compare the empire with Nazism, the ultimate proof of British aims are evident in its spending the last of its resources to oppose Germany in the world wars.

Social hierarchy is not itself immoral. Any large society will arrange a division of labor; the challenge is preventing functional hierarchy. There are countless examples of colonial administrators insisting on British rule of law applied in harmony with local customer, such Governor of Madras Thomas Muro writing in the 1820s to the East India Company directors: ‘You are not here to turn India into England or Scotland. Work through, not in spite of, native systems and native ways, with a prejudice in the favour rather than against them; and when in the fullness of time your subject can frame and maintain a worthy government for themselves, get out and take the glory of the achievement and the sense of having done your duty as the chief reward for your exertions’.

Because slavery had not existed in England for many centuries, the common law was silent. Parliament abolished slavery in British colonies in 1806, during the Napoleonic wars, subverting its economy. In 1819 the Foreign Office established an (anti) Slave Trade Department, its largest precinct during the 1820s and 30s. In contrast, Muslim slavery persisted to 1920. An estimated 17 million Africans were sold east over second millennium (?) versus 11 million across the Atlantic.
Colonial governments, especially in the dominions, unilaterally bound themselves to respecting native property law, as an extension of (western) natural law. Modern claims that treaties were made by uncomprehending natives do not falsify the intention, but do indicate partisanship. Further, the oral histories often cited as evidence are often framed, anthropology has shown, to make sense of the present rather than to demonstrate the past. Those in the 21st century who believe the West should cease ‘oppressing the global south’ largely align with 19th-century Christian missionaries, whom they pejoratively label imperialist. Whereas Nigerian national Chinua Achebe exemplifies those who recognize imperialism both harmed and helped: no culture has a right to isolation.

In Australasia and Africa, policies for detaining aboriginals were limited measures to preclude violent resistance to settlement, not ipso facto racism. Other times segregation was meant to protect natives. In North America as well, British government was borne of Christian, Enlightenment views of human equality and cultural advancement not the competition of social Darwinism. Economic exploitation is hardly unique to colonialism, see Stalinist or Maoist industrialization. Famines are not attributable to policy: they persisted in the postwar era. The novelty of welfare policies, as well as penurious colonial governmental, makes their absence an anachronism. There is no evidence of racism in India’s partition, but perhaps overcaution after failing to prevent Irish civil war. Comparisons with Nazism (but never Soviet communism) are polemical.

That India’s economic output, measured in a global framework, collapsed over the 19th century does not prove imperial exploitation, since independent China fell equally dramatically; the neo-Marxist theory of appropriating surplus does not account for the Industrial Revolution. To the contrary, free trade opened the English market to the UK’s disadvantage. In west Africa, the worst excesses of agricultural boards (commissariats) came from the hands of postcolonials exploiting dated systems. Between 1870-1945, three quarters of foreign capital invested into sub-Saharan Africa was British.

Contemporary historians fairly point to examples of racism, economic exploitation, cultural repression, and wanton violence. But these are not essential only wrongful. They overlook British suppression of slavery, efforts to moderate the impacts on traditional societies, the seeding of modern agriculture, the opportunity of free trade, and the provision of civil services and judiciary to pre-democratic societies. The dominions as well as Israel and the United States are some of the world’s most advanced countries.

Detractors cannot distinguish between just war and Fanon’s and Satre’s cathartic violence. Biggar, an ethicist rather than a historian, declares himself a Burkean conservative. Moral (Christian) understanding of human frailties should promote tolerance of past and even present shortcomings. He points out it’s banal to say Milner wanted power; of course he did, pressing the Cabinet into the second Boer for the purpose of securing English institutions including equal treatment of blacks, whereas Kruger sought legal subordination. In this and other instance, historians have got culpability wrong. Discussing the possibility of reparations, he notes what is just smaller or earlier societies may not be in larger or later countries. Compensation requires demonstration of current harm caused by past wrongs, not merely current disadvantage.

18. Ferguson, Empire (31 Dec 2008)

by kurto

Portrays the trajectory of Britain’s international role from 1650-1950, concentrating on the empire’s leading territories (Caribbean, America, India, southern Africa). Its primary themes are that England imitated its European rivals in acquiring by piracy; resulting migrations were large and sometimes explosive; missionary zeal set the social tone and liberty the political ideal; and the empire’s resolve to defeat Nazi totalitarianism. Though it can be read as an indictment, the book appears to conclude missteps and excesses do not superceed the many benefits of cultural transfer including land tenure, banking norms, common law, team sports as a principle of community, representative and limited government, and the idea of liberty itself. Ultimately a curious cross between history and political science. Its claims to pertain to 21st-century America aren’t clear. An enlightening introduction and conclusion.

6. Thornton, Imperial Idea and Its Enemies (23 Oct 2008)

by kurto

Chronicles the trajectory of imperialism in British (English) political thought circa 1850-1950. Relying sometimes on Socratic dialogue and occasionally on Parliamentary speeches, the book skips through India, Egypt and the Sudan, South Africa, and other locales, paying more attention to ideas than chronology. Leading thinkers of the two parties are the stars. The dominions and the two wars play a limited role, as do Victoria and Kitchener. Obviously sympathetic to the left and also contemporary opinion (a Whiggish historian?), the author concludes imperialism belongs to the liberal political tradition and so (as of 1957, the height of scuttle) had yet to run its course.

3. Kamen, Spain 1492-1763 (26 Feb 2012)

by kurto

Surveys Spain’s imperial era from the consolidation of Castilian power to the end of Anglo-French warfare. Not military conquest but adventurers, cooperative provincial elites, and Latin American coin fueled the global structure. Italy (Spanish Lombardy, based in Milan) provided crucial banking, armaments, and manpower. Spanish never became lingua franca; despite the civilizing mission of Catholicism, Castile’s elites remained intellectually and culturally insulated; and Europe did not look up to the peninsula. Power crested in 1635 and turned to France, which ‘took over’ in 1702 upon a Bourbon succeeding a Habsburg on the Spanish throne (prompting the War of Spanish Succession). Little interested in narrative politics and more attracted to sociocultural phenomena, the learned book grows dull in sections that dwell on Filipino and Ibero-American anthropology.

10. Ferguson, Empire (16 Jun 2019)

by kurto

Sketches the trajectory of the British Empire 1550-1950, at times suggesting the economic, cultural, and political benefits outweigh the unintended consequences, more often lamenting illogical ideology or failure to impart democracy. The principal mechanisms of transferring goods, capital, labor, and Western civics were language, land tenure, banking, common law, Protestantism, team sports, the ‘night watchman’ state, representative assemblies, and political liberty – the last the most distinct from Continental tradition. British imperialism originated in pirating Spanish shipping. The Glorious Revolution imported Dutch banking acumen: surpassing France in North America and India depended on credit. Immigration, which began with the Cromwellian settlement in Ireland, turned on indentured servitude, which accounted for over half of newcomers to North American over 1650-1780 (not forgetting more moved to the West Indies). In the Victorian era, the ‘subtext’ of the Canadian Durham report regretted liberty had not been sooner extended; the abolition of slavery was notable because it was still profitable; evangelicalism was remarkable for its admixture with economic and political ends, and was ultimately seen as subversive especially in India. Education provided unprecedented civil opportunities on the subcontinent. However, the ‘White Mutiny’, which asserted the right to jury trial by one’s own race, exposed prejudice that launched Indian nationalism, fueled not by poverty of masses but alienation of the privileged. In Africa, trading monopolies often converted to protectorates. Imperial Britain spent only 2.5% of its GDP on defense; over 1870-1914 the terms of trade appreciated 10%, bolstered by shipping and insurance revenue, enabling more imports to the UK. Empire was a source of pride; however, the Boer War made the public uneasy, World War I profoundly doubtful of the value of international power. By the end of World War II, as rival economies undermined Britain’s economic advantages and her balance of payments turned negative, political commitment evaporated and the Empire was ‘for sale’ – save that it was liquidated by US-led internationalism, exemplified by Suez. Despite the rising living standard of Victorian England, the principal beneficiaries of Empire were ultimately emigrants to the White Dominions, where team games fostered ‘greater Britain’. The source of Empire’s redemption lies not in political economy, however, but comparison with European rivals which made no attempt to impart liberty: Britain’s failure reveals its goodwill. Normatively, British imperialism fared best in the wastelands of Virginia and New England and least well in urban India, where the temptation to plunder superseded the impulse to build and transfer. The back-and-forth of Ferguson’s account founders on the reality that civic projects are steered less by countries, centuries at a time, but individuals whose concerns are often competing and changing. Criticizing a country’s intent often slips into hindsight.