Ibn Khaldun, the 14th-century Sufi scholar-stateman and Maliki jurist, has been wrongly taken by moderns as a sociologist avant la lettre, among other misconceptions. His proto-historical and -economic observations of Berber tribal as well as Maghreb, al-Andalusian, and Mamluk society are fundamentally medieval Islamic views, however much they seem to anticipate Montesquieu and Tocqueville. Though he studied social forces at work in events, sociology is inductive whereas Ibn Khaldun was a fatalist: Muqaddimah and other works avoid assessing causality. He thought more as a Muslim moralist: bad behaviors justified God’s striking down the wicked. He followed the counter-rationalist al-Ghazali, and saw the world as did many contemporary clerks. Life as cyclical and bleak: virile tribesmen conquered, made strong by asabiyyah (solidarity); mellowed in cities; and were themselves conquered. His own experience entailed living through the Black Death, prison, and constant intrigues in Fez and spartan towns of north Africa, as well as Cairo. Nonetheless his scholarship was sometimes innovative and has been influential.
Islam
4. Lewis, Crisis of Islam (22 Oct 2011)
Surveys the historical events and cultural trends which have produced Islamist terrorism. After reviewing Muslim theology pertaining to war and the West (particularly Christendom), the author assesses the Crusades, Renaissance and Reformation Europe, and the post-revolutionary era leading to the founding of Israel. America came to be the enemy both because it supplanted Britain as paragon of the imperialist West and also as it represents libertinism (i.e., separation of church and state, permissive public sexuality, commercialism). The failure of Islam to adopt to the market economy and democratic government have mired the peoples of the Muslim world’s Arabian heartland in destitution. Ironically, the one success story, Saudi oil production, has been so tightly restricted to elites that the country has become the wellspring of radical Wahabism, which often disregards traditional theology. A succinct and useful contribution to understanding the distinction between holy war and Muslim terrorism, but what can the West do to remedy matters?
19. Ramadan, Islam: The Essentials (8 Sep 2017)
Ostensibly a theological overview, the book reads as a plea for reformist Islam against literalist and traditionalist schools. A preliminary historical sketch emphasizes the ‘pragmatic’ character of military conquest by Mohammed and his early successors, in keeping with the ‘fellowship’ of Islam among Judaism and Christianity. As tradition set in — Sunni gained a reputation for deriving authority from the people, Shi’a from elites — Islam exhibited a crisis of confidence as early as the 12th century. By the 19th, as colonialism entered even the holy lands, Islam became a symbol of resistance to Western values, in which literalism sharpened the contrast. The emphasis became unique rules and mores, sometimes evidencing the sociocultural traits of Arab, Turk, or Persian people rather than the ethics of the Koran. (Ironically, during the early modern period it was seen as sensual and permissive.) The author acknowledges Islamic societies fall short of cosmopolitan, if not to say progressive, socioeconomic standards. Formalism has all but banished critical thinking needed by democracy; but the causes are said to be temporal, worldly; he does not confront so-called political Islam’s descent to terrorism. Islam needs widespread education in legalistic analysis of the Koran — a tall order; ultimately it may instead require a charismatic, peaceful figure such as Martin King. Useful as an overview, engaging during parts of the second half, limited as a sociopolitical solution.
20. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam (14 Sep 2017)
An extended essay on the place of Islam in the global sphere, generally recurring to three themes: sources and consequences of theocracy, Islam’s historical relationship with the West, and Islam in the 20th and 21st centuries. In contrast to Judeo-Christianity, Islam can be seen as a religion subdivided into nations; Christian clergy haven’t enjoyed equivalent social authority in at least three centuries. There are chiefly two political traditions, quietism in authoritarian society and radical activism, both borne of Mohammed’s life (and of course several schools of legal interpretation). As regards the West, the Crusades were unimportant to contemporary Ottomans. The end of the expansionary era (as marked by Lepanto and Vienna) was more significant. Most important, Islam was already superseded by European technological and economic progress, such as Atlantic maritime trade, and well closed to foreign intellectual currents — since the 9th century, only 100,000 Western books have been translated in Arabic, the equivalent of a year’s production in Spain. Muslims never saw their expansion as imperial, but in the modern era, which began with the coming of Napoleon, fundamentalism has required an enemy. In 20th-century Arabia, Wahhabism allied to Saudi nationalism presented themselves as keepers of the holy land; with the decline of pan Arabism — only Palestine didn’t succeed in creating a nation-state — nationalism and fundamentalism have blurred. The Iranian revolution was a fundamentalist coup d’etat, and the author asserts the hostage crisis was a response to improving US ties. Similarly, first Sadat’s accord and then the collapse of the USSR forced Palestinians to talk with Israel. Latterly, terrorist bombings violate the Islamic prohibition against suicide (which is not proof of martyrdom), more evidence that fundamentalism has come to ignore its origins.
18. Rubenstein, Aristotle’s Children (17 October 2020)
Assesses Aristotle’s influence in early Islam and late medieval Europe. The philosopher’s works thrive in confident historical eras: to know is to understand causes; to reason is to press boundaries. Aristotelian thought fell into desuetude with the fall of the Roman empire; traveled to Persia and Mesopotamia in the 6th century with the flight of Nestorius; and spurred Averroes, Avicenna, and Maimonides who elaborated the connection of reason and Muslim faith. They were surpassed in the 12th century by al Ghazali, who contended that God produces all effects. Still Muslim advances into Europe brought Aristotle back to the Latin world, where Dominicans in particular saw reason as elaborating faith, none more than Thomas Aquinas. The doctrinal controversies of the next three centuries turned on where to draw boundaries; the neoplatonic division of spirit and matter was sidelined. Aquinas’ dual causation asserted God causes matter to cause themselves. William of Ockham initiated the Western sundering of faith and reason, by asserting it was too complicated to coexistence, paving the way for Luther to complete the split (albeit more on a socioeconomic basis). The idea of medieval dark age is dependent on the prejudice that science had to free itself of fundamentalism; conversely fundamentalist doctrine too emerged from (i.e., did not preexist) the attack of Aquinas’ absolution of Aristotelian science. Lively and told in a light, almost smarmy, manner but dated in failing to confront Aristotle’s postmodern challengers.