Studies the development of counterinsurgency doctrine in the postwar era, characterized by asymmetric military-political operations. Selected case studies illustrate the thesis that the people are the prize, until in later phases the conventional or the exit becomes possible.

Between 1943 and 1975, almost all western Europe’s colonies were handed back, in aggregate history’s largest recorded transfer of territory. Malaya, 1952-54, was among the most successful counterinsurgency campaigns. The British protected villages, eschewed torture for productive interrogation, and trained locals in security measures and low-key fighting and maneuvers. Contemporary Borneo evidenced the importance of British offensive action: containment fails if solely passive. In this era, generally the British come of favorably to the Americans.
In Vietnam, the US ignored winning the populace, instead seeking to stop a North Korea-style invasion, though the engagement’s different nature was already evident by 1959. Generalship under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations reprised Eisenhower-era tradecraft: Johnson even authorized Westmoreland to send troops against insurgents operating independent of South Viet forces. 95% of combat forces engaged in search-and-destroy mission instead of clear-and-hold; Westmoreland did not retain what had been cleared. (Later the Americans made the mistake of rotating individuals not units, at the expense of continuity.) The authors conclude, however, that failure in Vietnam bought time for Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to stave off Communist expansion. Relatedly, if government is charged with protecting individual rights, then rights must inhere in individuals.
Indochina raised the question of how to separate anti-communism from nationalism. In Algeria, the European population was approximately 10 percent of 10.5 million, a substantially higher proportion, pointing up new questions of self-determination. Torture in that African country was considered antithetical to French values, making it unpopular in France.
1973’s Yom Kippur war showed deterrence works only when consequences are seen to be overwhelming. (Conventionally, attacking forces ought to outnumber defenders by at least 3:1, concentrating on the most vulnerable points.) Money spent on deterrence is seldom wasted, in comparison with the cost of war.
The Falklands War illustrated the evolution of naval campaigning, that is the integration of tactical land action. Smallish military operations in Grenada and Panama offered further lessons; absent Grenda, it’s doubtful the US would have improved its joint operations. As it turned out the USSR saw evidence for conceding.
Vietnam had introduced casualty rates as a focus of domestic criticism; 1993’s debacle in Somalia persuaded the US to stay out of Rwanda. Then the Falklands, Iraq, Serbia, and Gaza brought forth a just war-flavored idea of acceptable enemy rates – at least in Western countries. The UN has usually failed in its original mission of preventing interstate conflict. (It’s better at managing children, refugees, and world health(!).) To what extent are powerful nations responsible for the affairs of failed states even though they have no national interest there?
At the start of the 1990s in Iraq, precision munitions constituted 2% of armament; at the end in the Balkans, the proportion had grown to 90%. Hence the future of the West depends in part on the best fighter planes and pilots. In the 21st century, Western armies have become very dependent on civilian technologies such as robotics, data analytics, and AI, a reversal of the prior century. (AI is tactically brilliant but strategically banal, George Friedman writes.) After a century which favored mobility and agility, drones may reintroduce the advantages of mass and quantity. Not only supply chains but generalized interdependence of the Western countries has created more vulnerability. But the authors denigrate ‘isolationism’ (presumably in contradistinction to freeloading).
Turning to Petraeus’ direct participation, the primary issue confronting Afghanistan’s postwar government in 2001 was incorporating the defeated Taliban. Managing the country was a more difficult matter than Iraq, despite a lower level of social violence, because of its geography: no roads, harsh winters, and the proximity of sanctuary in Pakistan. Karzai would ultimately fail to assemble a catholic loya jirga, despite military and civil assistance outstripping the Marshall Plan. By 2006, the Taliban was again on the offensive. Counterinsurgency tactics must persist in the postwar. Relatedly, there’s nothing wrong with planning to withdraw, but announcement removes every reason to cooperate.
In post-Saddam Iraq, Petraeus’ predecessor Jerry Bremer went too far in replacing the prior regime, notably security personnel, thereby destroying the successor state’s foundation. Maliki ruled in narrow interests, as in Vietnam, leading to civil war. Condoleezza Rice’s clear-and-hold would have performed better than Don Rumsfeld’s soon-as-possible transition. Further, Bremer ruled as a viceroy. Every liberating army has a half-life before it becomes an occupier: stripping back too far reduces both goodwill and time. Petraeus elaborates his technical approach; one wonders what was censored?
In contemporary Ukraine, Putin didn’t see the advantages of the World War II offensive had shifted in the Internet era to defensive postures, facilitated by distributed communications and low-tech harassment. Russia’s numerical advantage was too low, especially for urban warfare, and Moscow’s ineffectively steered tactical adjustments, deployment of reserves, logistics, etc. (The Ukrainians could rely on fixed-base logistics, the Russians could not.) Evidence as at time of writing is warfare had returned to the strategy of the hedgehog: when there is little sanctuary, the defense must disperse.
Modern military leadership entails grasp of the strategic situation – getting the big picture right – effectively communicating to troops and also civilian leaders, and driving execution. Officers recursively refine, adapt, and supplement.