Narrates the 1967 conflict which shaped succeeding geopolitics of the late 20th-century Middle East. Based on primary sources from most of the combatants (save Syria), the comprehensive work points up the Arab world’s explicit linking of Israel and the US over 40 years ago and the imperious role of defense minister Moshe Dayan, whose de Gaulle-like introduction to Levi Eshkel’s cabinet overshadowed the indecisive prime minister. Oren’s scholarship is somewhat tempered by choppy prose (i.e., howevers, buts, yets) that obscure the sweep of his direction. Though definitive, the work also seems to have been superseded (dated) by Islamofascism, which has positioned the Arab-Israeli problem as but one stumbling block in the feudalistic worldview’s inability to peacefully coexist with modernity and the West.