Military

12. Petraeus and Roberts, Conflict (29 June 2025)

by kurto

Studies the development of counterinsurgency doctrine in the postwar era, characterized by asymmetric military-political operations. Selected case studies illustrate the thesis that the people are the prize, until in later phases the conventional or the exit becomes possible.

Between 1943 and 1975, almost all western Europe’s colonies were handed back, in aggregate history’s largest recorded transfer of territory. Malaya, 1952-54, was among the most successful counterinsurgency campaigns. The British protected villages, eschewed torture for productive interrogation, and trained locals in security measures and low-key fighting and maneuvers. Contemporary Borneo evidenced the importance of British offensive action: containment fails if solely passive. In this era, generally the British come of favorably to the Americans.
In Vietnam, the US ignored winning the populace, instead seeking to stop a North Korea-style invasion, though the engagement’s different nature was already evident by 1959. Generalship under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations reprised Eisenhower-era tradecraft: Johnson even authorized Westmoreland to send troops against insurgents operating independent of South Viet forces. 95% of combat forces engaged in search-and-destroy mission instead of clear-and-hold; Westmoreland did not retain what had been cleared. (Later the Americans made the mistake of rotating individuals not units, at the expense of continuity.) The authors conclude, however, that failure in Vietnam bought time for Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to stave off Communist expansion. Relatedly, if government is charged with protecting individual rights, then rights must inhere in individuals.
Indochina raised the question of how to separate anti-communism from nationalism. In Algeria, the European population was approximately 10 percent of 10.5 million, a substantially higher proportion, pointing up new questions of self-determination. Torture in that African country was considered antithetical to French values, making it unpopular in France.
1973’s Yom Kippur war showed deterrence works only when consequences are seen to be overwhelming. (Conventionally, attacking forces ought to outnumber defenders by at least 3:1, concentrating on the most vulnerable points.) Money spent on deterrence is seldom wasted, in comparison with the cost of war.
The Falklands War illustrated the evolution of naval campaigning, that is the integration of tactical land action. Smallish military operations in Grenada and Panama offered further lessons; absent Grenda, it’s doubtful the US would have improved its joint operations. As it turned out the USSR saw evidence for conceding.
Vietnam had introduced casualty rates as a focus of domestic criticism; 1993’s debacle in Somalia persuaded the US to stay out of Rwanda. Then the Falklands, Iraq, Serbia, and Gaza brought forth a just war-flavored idea of acceptable enemy rates – at least in Western countries. The UN has usually failed in its original mission of preventing interstate conflict. (It’s better at managing children, refugees, and world health(!).) To what extent are powerful nations responsible for the affairs of failed states even though they have no national interest there?
At the start of the 1990s in Iraq, precision munitions constituted 2% of armament; at the end in the Balkans, the proportion had grown to 90%. Hence the future of the West depends in part on the best fighter planes and pilots. In the 21st century, Western armies have become very dependent on civilian technologies such as robotics, data analytics, and AI, a reversal of the prior century. (AI is tactically brilliant but strategically banal, George Friedman writes.) After a century which favored mobility and agility, drones may reintroduce the advantages of mass and quantity. Not only supply chains but generalized interdependence of the Western countries has created more vulnerability. But the authors denigrate ‘isolationism’ (presumably in contradistinction to freeloading).
Turning to Petraeus’ direct participation, the primary issue confronting Afghanistan’s postwar government in 2001 was incorporating the defeated Taliban. Managing the country was a more difficult matter than Iraq, despite a lower level of social violence, because of its geography: no roads, harsh winters, and the proximity of sanctuary in Pakistan. Karzai would ultimately fail to assemble a catholic loya jirga, despite military and civil assistance outstripping the Marshall Plan. By 2006, the Taliban was again on the offensive. Counterinsurgency tactics must persist in the postwar. Relatedly, there’s nothing wrong with planning to withdraw, but announcement removes every reason to cooperate.
In post-Saddam Iraq, Petraeus’ predecessor Jerry Bremer went too far in replacing the prior regime, notably security personnel, thereby destroying the successor state’s foundation. Maliki ruled in narrow interests, as in Vietnam, leading to civil war. Condoleezza Rice’s clear-and-hold would have performed better than Don Rumsfeld’s soon-as-possible transition. Further, Bremer ruled as a viceroy. Every liberating army has a half-life before it becomes an occupier: stripping back too far reduces both goodwill and time. Petraeus elaborates his technical approach; one wonders what was censored?
In contemporary Ukraine, Putin didn’t see the advantages of the World War II offensive had shifted in the Internet era to defensive postures, facilitated by distributed communications and low-tech harassment. Russia’s numerical advantage was too low, especially for urban warfare, and Moscow’s ineffectively steered tactical adjustments, deployment of reserves, logistics, etc. (The Ukrainians could rely on fixed-base logistics, the Russians could not.) Evidence as at time of writing is warfare had returned to the strategy of the hedgehog: when there is little sanctuary, the defense must disperse.
Modern military leadership entails grasp of the strategic situation – getting the big picture right – effectively communicating to troops and also civilian leaders, and driving execution. Officers recursively refine, adapt, and supplement.

5. Ellis, His Excellency (2005)

by kurto

Washington was a physically dominating figure who was not well educated, but married into elite society. Possessing an outsized ego, he managed his image closely, particularly regarding early military failures. After a successful French and Indian War, he accumulated land and aspired to fulfill the promise of the west, but his debts to British cotton agents transformed him into a revolutionary. Ideology played no real role, although he did wrestle with the question of slavery. As a general in the Revolutionary War, he is proclivity was to attack but he realized survival was the victory, a la Fabius. He grew to recognize the ineffectiveness of the Articles of Confederation during this time, and subsequently agreed to lead the Constitutional Convention and become the first president. He disliked partisan politics, reluctantly agreed to a second term, and all but dismissed Jefferson as a schemer. Hamilton was responsible for much of the administration’s success. Ultimately, says Ellis, Washington never conquered his ego but recognized posterity is the final judge and had the confidence to submit — unlike Napoleon, Lenin, Mao, etc.

8. Spencer, Battle for Europe (17 May 2006)

by kurto

A well-constructed analysis of 1704’s Battle of Blenheim, in which John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, defeated (and captured!) armies of Louis XIV for the first time in nearly 50 years. The book nimbly progresses from Europe’s turn-of-the-century political environment (and Britains’s since the Glorious Revolution), to the War of Spanish Succession, and finally on to campaigning and the famous battlefield. Churchill and Prince Eugene of Savoy are the protagonists. Though it would be another five years before the conflict’s denouement, the battle ended French ambitions of annexing the Holy Roman Empire (or its remnants), and led to repulse from Italy. In Britain, Blenheim reshaped the country’s military stature on the Continent, and when aligned with sea power, set the stage of the first great imperial age of the 18th century. Primarily a synthesis of leading works; needs more theater maps; highly readable.

24. Skidmore, Bosworth (27 Nov 2022)

by kurto

Narrates the civil war between the Plantagenet houses of York and Lancaster over the second half of the 15th century, culminating in the battle of Bosworth, in which Henry VII bested incumbent Richard III with the aid of the turncoat Stanleys, and the Tudor dynasty’s establishment through victorious Henry’s marrying Edward VI’s daughter Elizabeth to unite the lines. Using a popular style to point up contemporary sociopolitical perceptions as well as military and political calculation, the author is well balanced and generally steers clear of omniscience. Still, it is antiquarian in that no ideas or values seem to be at stake, only allegiances and place in an aristocratic society.

12. Johnson, Napoleon (4 Sep 2006)

by kurto

Bonaparte, a militarist whose desire to conquer the Continent foreshadowed the total warfare of the 20th century, is a prime example of unbridled ambition to absolute power. The Corsican was a master of cartography and logistics, and typically sought to attack in order to isolate and conquer. But in sweeping away Europe’s old order, he substituted nepotism not enlightened government or culture; his favorable reputation largely rests on a propaganda apparatus (including mastery of the contemporary news cycle via semaphore). Though he anticipated Stalin and Hitler, the French have proclaimed him a hero. Thematic and synthetic rather than chronological, the book is a typically strong effort from Johnson.

13. Magnus, Kitchener (15 Sep 2007)

by kurto

A definitive biography of the late Victorian solider, whose autocratic successes in Sudan and South Africa inspired adulation in the metropole, but left him unprepared to lead Great Britain during World War I. The scale of strategy and scope of operations were too great for one man; the lessons learned were put to good use in World War II. Written in the tradition of political-diplomatic history, the book relies on primary sources from the highest levels (i.e., autobiographies) to portray this thorough (his motto) and driven but ultimately indecisive figure. Kitchener was unable to rally and guide equals, or defeat evenly matched colleagues / opponents, because he could not persuade or rely on staff to create superior force. Magnus moves briskly through events, while providing insight into Kitchener’s relationship with Asquith, Churchill, and King Edward, as well as the mechanics of British imperial machinery. This 1958 work, though evidencing dated punctuation, has lost very little with the passage of time. No need to read further on the topic.

4. McChrystal, My Share of the Task (2 Jun 2013)

by kurto

A military memoir sketching how General McChrystal reorganized practice and doctrine during America’s two anti-terrorist wars of the 2000s, Iraq and Afghanistan. The author’s command was primarily reactive and tactical: indeed, politics proved his undoing, as the Obama administration disliked both the Afghan theater and a McChrystal interview. Though highly praised, there seems little in the way or overarching approach; however, McChrystal’s extended record of sound decisions and execution is enviable.

5. Ricks, Generals (14 Jun 2014)

by kurto

A whirlwind study of US army leadership from the time of George Marshall. The military has all but abandoned the practice of rewarding officer success and treating failure by giving another a chance at command (and the relieved officer another chance elsewhere), thereby deferring personnel decisions to civilian oversight, which the army abhors for operational reasons. The trend began with McArthur and has persisted through the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The army reached its quotidian / tactical nadir in Vietnam and then recovered, but has has yet to come to grips with a strategic doctrine for winning (i.e., ending) 21st-century, asymmetric conflict. This remaining gap, Ricks asserts, is attributable to conventional, insular career paths. A fine organizational study free of jargon.