Washington was a physically dominating figure who was not well educated, but married into elite society. Possessing an outsized ego, he managed his image closely, particularly regarding early military failures. After a successful French and Indian War, he accumulated land and aspired to fulfill the promise of the west, but his debts to British cotton agents transformed him into a revolutionary. Ideology played no real role, although he did wrestle with the question of slavery. As a general in the Revolutionary War, he is proclivity was to attack but he realized survival was the victory, a la Fabius. He grew to recognize the ineffectiveness of the Articles of Confederation during this time, and subsequently agreed to lead the Constitutional Convention and become the first president. He disliked partisan politics, reluctantly agreed to a second term, and all but dismissed Jefferson as a schemer. Hamilton was responsible for much of the administration’s success. Ultimately, says Ellis, Washington never conquered his ego but recognized posterity is the final judge and had the confidence to submit — unlike Napoleon, Lenin, Mao, etc.
Military
8. Spencer, Battle for Europe (17 May 2006)
A well-constructed analysis of 1704’s Battle of Blenheim, in which John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, defeated (and captured!) armies of Louis XIV for the first time in nearly 50 years. The book nimbly progresses from Europe’s turn-of-the-century political environment (and Britains’s since the Glorious Revolution), to the War of Spanish Succession, and finally on to campaigning and the famous battlefield. Churchill and Prince Eugene of Savoy are the protagonists. Though it would be another five years before the conflict’s denouement, the battle ended French ambitions of annexing the Holy Roman Empire (or its remnants), and led to repulse from Italy. In Britain, Blenheim reshaped the country’s military stature on the Continent, and when aligned with sea power, set the stage of the first great imperial age of the 18th century. Primarily a synthesis of leading works; needs more theater maps; highly readable.
24. Skidmore, Bosworth (27 Nov 2022)
Narrates the civil war between the Plantagenet houses of York and Lancaster over the second half of the 15th century, culminating in the battle of Bosworth, in which Henry VII bested incumbent Richard III with the aid of the turncoat Stanleys, and the Tudor dynasty’s establishment through victorious Henry’s marrying Edward VI’s daughter Elizabeth to unite the lines. Using a popular style to point up contemporary sociopolitical perceptions as well as military and political calculation, the author is well balanced and generally steers clear of omniscience. Still, it is antiquarian in that no ideas or values seem to be at stake, only allegiances and place in an aristocratic society.
12. Johnson, Napoleon (4 Sep 2006)
Bonaparte, a militarist whose desire to conquer the Continent foreshadowed the total warfare of the 20th century, is a prime example of unbridled ambition to absolute power. The Corsican was a master of cartography and logistics, and typically sought to attack in order to isolate and conquer. But in sweeping away Europe’s old order, he substituted nepotism not enlightened government or culture; his favorable reputation largely rests on a propaganda apparatus (including mastery of the contemporary news cycle via semaphore). Though he anticipated Stalin and Hitler, the French have proclaimed him a hero. Thematic and synthetic rather than chronological, the book is a typically strong effort from Johnson.
13. Magnus, Kitchener (15 Sep 2007)
A definitive biography of the late Victorian solider, whose autocratic successes in Sudan and South Africa inspired adulation in the metropole, but left him unprepared to lead Great Britain during World War I. The scale of strategy and scope of operations were too great for one man; the lessons learned were put to good use in World War II. Written in the tradition of political-diplomatic history, the book relies on primary sources from the highest levels (i.e., autobiographies) to portray this thorough (his motto) and driven but ultimately indecisive figure. Kitchener was unable to rally and guide equals, or defeat evenly matched colleagues / opponents, because he could not persuade or rely on staff to create superior force. Magnus moves briskly through events, while providing insight into Kitchener’s relationship with Asquith, Churchill, and King Edward, as well as the mechanics of British imperial machinery. This 1958 work, though evidencing dated punctuation, has lost very little with the passage of time. No need to read further on the topic.
4. McChrystal, My Share of the Task (2 Jun 2013)
A military memoir sketching how General McChrystal reorganized practice and doctrine during America’s two anti-terrorist wars of the 2000s, Iraq and Afghanistan. The author’s command was primarily reactive and tactical: indeed, politics proved his undoing, as the Obama administration disliked both the Afghan theater and a McChrystal interview. Though highly praised, there seems little in the way or overarching approach; however, McChrystal’s extended record of sound decisions and execution is enviable.
5. Ricks, Generals (14 Jun 2014)
A whirlwind study of US army leadership from the time of George Marshall. The military has all but abandoned the practice of rewarding officer success and treating failure by giving another a chance at command (and the relieved officer another chance elsewhere), thereby deferring personnel decisions to civilian oversight, which the army abhors for operational reasons. The trend began with McArthur and has persisted through the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The army reached its quotidian / tactical nadir in Vietnam and then recovered, but has has yet to come to grips with a strategic doctrine for winning (i.e., ending) 21st-century, asymmetric conflict. This remaining gap, Ricks asserts, is attributable to conventional, insular career paths. A fine organizational study free of jargon.