Montesquieu

12. Richter, Political Theory of Montesquieu (2 July)

by kurto

An extended survey of Montesquieu’s works and selections from the most famous, notably Persian Letters and Spirit of the Laws.

    Survey
Causes of Rome
Rome fell because wealth became despised by the populace, so the patricians ceded their privileges in hopes of retaining access to power
More states have perished from corruption of moeurs than lawbreaking
Whenever in a republic all is tranquil, the state is no longer free. True harmony includes dissonance
Spirit
Solon divided the classes not to determine eligibility to vote but to hold office
In a tyranny, religion is the depository of moeurs and fundamental laws because the judiciary is unreliable
In monarchies, free speech is not on behalf of truth but because candor indicates power
Since everything human must end, so virtuous government must end, usually when the legislature becomes more corrupt than the executive. In a democracy, first comes corruption, then the laws are no longer executed. Once principles are corrupted, even good laws work against the state. Corrupt republics rarely do great things: only a people with simple moeurs establish societies, cities, laws.
In a democracy, power is the chief characteristic of the people; liberty is its effect, but not the source of power. Liberty is tranquility derived from personal security. However, the greater the apparent advantages of liberty, the nearer the republic is to losing it. First comes the petty tyrants, then the single dictator.
True equality is far from extreme equality. True equality is not that everyone or no one commands; but that we command or obey only equals. Citizens whose condition is so weak may be considered to have no will of their own: they are incapable of taking part in the execution of society’s ends.
Republics succeed in small geographies. In large ones, the state’s resources corrupt officeholders: the public good recedes from view. Sparta persisted because its sole end was liberty.
Harrington explore how far a state’s constitution may carry liberty, but forgot liberty’s essence. As Tacitus observed, it’s extraordinary that corrupt Roman conquerors led Germanic barbarians to solidify those moeurs which led to English constitutionalism.
There are two types of tyranny, the real and violent, and tyranny of opinion, when those who govern institute things contrary to the nation’s moeurs.
Political vices are not necessarily moral vices and vice versa, a reasonwhy laws against the spirit of society are tenuous. Means exist for preventing crimes (penalties), and can serve to change moeurs. To assert that laws or religion do not always restrain society is to overlook that frequently they do. Civility is superior to politeness: the former prevents us from displaying our own vices. The more people in a nation, the more evident and necessary are both.

7. Courtney, Montesquieu and Burke (11 Apr 2020)

by kurto

 Montesquieu deeply influenced Burke, particularly regarding the parliamentarian’s understanding of the British constitution and application of history. While sharing common views of l’esprit generale (roughly, sociological characteristics which interact with a country’s laws), the legislator (a representative not a delegate), and natural law (a superstructure for l’esprit), Burke’s outstanding debt consists of applying the Frenchman’s methods in a partisan way. From Montesquieu, Burke learned to derive a people’s nature from geographic, sociological, and historical events and used it to craft Rockingham ‘propaganda’ in political disputes over the American rebellion, Indian governance and the Hastings trial, and George III’s role in politics. Burke’s rationalizations do not rise to the level of political thought. But the era’s constitutional struggles particularly trouble this interpretation. Montesquieu’s identifying British separation of powers proved popular for articulating the outcome of 17th-century politics. Burke, an early enthusiast, opposed George’s capacity to influence Parliament and contended (in 1782) the crown’s power should be limited to appearance. Courtney observes the monarch conformed with the letter of the law, but elsewhere he says Burke bridged from Montesquieu to Bagehot’s 19th-century understanding. Further, he allows Reflections on the Revolution in France indeed rose to the level of political thought: Burke skillfully enunciated commonly held views or showed the way back to classical views. (In this, Courtney anachronistically calls Burke conservative.) The author holds to Namier’s view of individual behavior being explicable by classifiable political types, and the broad sweep of events corresponding to this structure, so to concede Burke’s originality is to undermine his presuppositions. Courtney also seems unhappy Burke moved on from considering history a repository of ‘scientific laws’ to a storehouse of the wisdom of precedent, and that he articulated principles for making these accessible.

8. Pangle, Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism (26 Apr 2020)

by kurto

Montesquieu’s Esprit des Lois simultaneously rejects Aristotelian virtue and universal (i.e., Lockean) liberalism by asserting that moral vices and sociocultural particularisms determine the best mankind can hope for. Man’s nature is a source of justice in the Hobbesian sense of self-preservation, but only as refracted through custom and circumstance. History not teleology holds the key to political comity.

Like Aristotle, Montesquieu studies political regimes; however, whereas for the former the goal of a republic is the best use of freedom (i.e., virtue), for the latter it’s freedom itself. Anticipating Hegel, in a regime where freedom is less than ne plus ultra, some will oppress others simply to avoid oppression. Montesquieu also denies Aristotle’s exultation of the philosophic gentlemen or the statesman. Through private vice such as building wealth, which leads to superabundance, public virtue emerges and thence to patriotism. Religious (e.g., Christian) virtue unacceptably contests the state’s ends. Pangle shows Montesquieu’s definition creates an egalitarian politics with no definite end, only relative characteristics and lack of oppression.

The political sphere is not the source of society’s way of life. Statecraft is less important than the past, subconsciously carried forward. In emphasizing history as revealing social mores, Montesquieu can be seen as the progenitor of sociology, and more obviously foreshadowing Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Cool climates promote restlessness and more specifically scrutiny of government, revealing man’s passion for security, since liberty is an opinion of security. Also in the future, Burke would emphasize custom and Rousseau set aside the ancient emphasis on excellence in favor of base equality and freedom.

A republic (whether aristocratic or democratic) is more easily achieved in small, agrarian units. Montesquieu makes the case for separation of powers, moderate (limited) criminal law, and commerce as harnessing man’s passions to the general welfare. He favored competition between aristocrats and commoners, mediated by monarchy, to check tyranny and also to promote excellence as against mediocrity. As a formula: balance of power and separation of power promotes efficiency (i.e., minimum of friction) in reaching civic ends. In Montesquieu’s treatment of law, one foresees utilitarianism: restraints are to provide universalization of liberty and security, not the promotion of higher ends. Economic superabundance provides for social goods, such as freedom to philosophize. The English system provides an example. It lacks politesse but evidences morals. The English are not worldly but usefully focused on commerce. Consequently their political liberties are well balanced, exemplary. Yet Montesquieu overlooks the Tory institutional loyalties which are the foundation of social opinion, Pangle writes.

The legislator is to be prudent, not high minded, working through man’s passions. To understand a law, Montesquieu says, we have to view its intent, what’s it’s trying to solve. He is modern in espousing a system of institutional balance and competing interests, and preeminently insists on the applicability of circumstance as manifest through historic custom. His views failed to foresee or provide for defense against the French Revolution, Pangle observes, and paradoxically underestimated the durability of English liberty. The author asks: is formulaic security yet to be overwhelmed by man’s intrinsic nature? But Montesquieu, in bringing the principles of political thought down to the realm of current events, calls us to a contemporary accountability.