20. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics (27 Oct 2019)

            Metaphysics is the study of absolute presuppositions which underpin contemporary scientific inquiry. Invented by Aristotle, who erroneously conceived it as a science of being (‘ontology’ to Collingwood), the subject’s birth simultaneously gave rise to science: for to think scientifically is to answer a question; questions require presuppositions; and all such questions and presuppositions must somehow be grounded. (Propositions seek to answer ‘is it true’ or similar queries; facts, from Bacon onward, are things that answer questions.) All metaphysical questions are historical questions: what was the contemporary view?

Mistaking the certainties of one’s age for the certainties of all ages is a fundamental error. It is religion’s role to promote the development of absolute presuppositions. Thus Collingwood concludes the Christian church has been the guarantor of Western science. He shows how the doctrine of the trinity corresponds with modern science, which rests of absolute presupposition of nature as one, and therefore science as one in corresponding to law.

‘Antimetaphysics’ is an irrational, unscientific view of life, to which Collingwood ascribes various personas. Deductive metaphysics is a constellation of absolute presuppositions which are without conflict, like coherent mathematics; but metaphysics (i.e., history of ideas) is never without internal tensions. Logical positivism, which seeks to prove presuppositions (and all else) as fact, is the most prominent example of the pair of enemies of metaphysics; in actuality it treats fact in a medieval manner.

By targeting metaphysics, positivism continues the 18th-century attack on classical Greek thought. Separately, psychology, which purports to be the science of how we think, cannot claim dominion over metaphysics because it does not uniquely do so (so too does logic) and since it makes no recourse to truth and falsehood and thus to self-criticism which is the end of thinking (i.e., was my thought successful?). Theoretic thought is logic, practical thought is ethics. Psychology in actuality is not cognitive (as the ancients thought); it is the science of feeling; lacking not only self-criticism but also a science of the body and also an understanding of truth, it is no science at all. Psychology is a pseudo-science which cannot supplant metaphysics and other sciences because it ignores procedure: it is the propaganda of irrationalism, which is not a conspiracy but an epidemic undermining the scientific pursuit of truth.

Elsewhere, Collingwood treats the sequence of physics from Newton (all events have causes) to Einstein (all events are governed by laws, but most have no cause). Physicians escaped the anthropomorphic problems of the 19th century – nature causing things – by concluding there are few causes only behavior according to law. But philosophers and positivists alike extended Kant’s view that every event has a cause. Kant himself considered metaphysics as ‘god, freedom, immortality’. Of his categories of modality – possibility, actuality, necessity – possibility (i.e., something that could be) is a major stumbling block for positivism. The scholastics considered that pagans ended Roman civilization, but it was really the loss of faith in Latin absolute presuppositions.

23. Walsh, Introduction to Philosophy of History (14 Dec 2019)

Surveys concepts in philosophy of history, toward an understanding of a discipline that’s independent of science. Citing Collingwood’s view of the emergence of history as an early 20th-century phenomenon and noting contemporary British aversion to Continental views, the author commences with a dialectic approach to truth and fact (i.e., the unbiased search for all evidence), objectivity (unbiased but not as in science replicable, due to the personality of the practitioner), and explanation (including those events in which the truth is expressed). History can be objective in that we have rational conviction in the findings, as a portrait artist sees a subject from a point of view but certainly has real insight into the subject. That is, the historian has presuppositions but is not cut off from all understanding; his responsibility is to present an interpretation of all the evidence he admits. To establish cause is to establish means and motive, or to identify necessary conditions, or to determine the balance of the efficacy of forces. Colligation is a related process of rendering isolated events intelligible, dependent on connecting thought to action; however, it tends toward teleology or even Hegel’s universals in disguise. Still, cause / reason for adoption of ideas (and degree of success) is to be demonstrated. Memory provides access to the past but is not fact – it’s insufficient for verification. Truth and fact are divided between correspondence (to other accepted facts) and coherence (to accepted ideas or theories). Correspondence raises questions of which fact? Coherence lacks an element of independence (i.e., the past is dead). Oakeshott belongs to the latter school. Knowledge of the past must rest on evidence that is present. Walsh attempts a synthesis: all statements are relative to the constellation of evidence (coherence), all fact-based premises are independent (correspondence). As new evidence is constantly emerging, conclusions are inevitably provisional.

In history, to know the big things it’s necessary to know the details. The narration of events such that they explain themselves makes them ready-made for analysis. Whereas instrumental events are closer to science, easily recognized as fact. That is, the event cannot be falsified. The author accuses Oakeshott of an overly theoretic history, one that is independent of inquiry, and so a reductio ad absurdum that implicitly contrasts with Collingwood. Could it not be that facts suggest questions and sometimes so too the historian’s worldview? For to suggest history is solely the latter is to concede Heideggerian historicism. Further, history may not be teleological but it can reasonably be seen as a sequence of problems or events that cascade into one another.

Science differs from history in aspiring to the universal, in being predictive, whereas history is particular and cannot be replicated. (Collingwood: a scientist looks at mere phenomena, a historian for thoughts within events.) ‘Positivist’ historians, most obviously Marxists but also those associated with Popper, view history akin to engineering: practical application of known principles. Idealists are concerned with thought and experience, and unique and immediate character. Collingwood controversially asserted once the fundamental idea(s) have been identified, the matter’s essence could be intuited; Walsh counters this may be so if studying Admiral Nelson but not if a witch doctor. 

Kant believed in an engine of history, following in the metaphysical tradition of seeking to understand the source of evil. Universal laws of nature, especially causality, do not provide the particular relations of events – the principle assumed is a material principle. The problem is relation of a priori to empirical elements. It’s too easy to fall into dogma. Hegel, the exemplar of the dialectic, believed the triad of fact, ideas (i.e., logic), and spirit must be reconciled to history; history is most aligned with spirit. Hegel was trying to make sense of a master narrative, and used the dialectic more than Kant or Enlightenment thinkers; he used a priori grounds of the triad. Ultimately, he identified the free with the self-contained or self-sufficient, and thus not with the individual but with society.

Seeing in the past certain preconceptions is not a private matter, it is metaphysics in Collingwood’s sense. Walsh uses the analogy of foreign travel: curiosity fades to learning how the locals see things, and then comparing with how things are at home. In a famous dispute, Trevelyan prevailed over Bury’s view of history as a science: the purpose of history is understanding the character of one’s own time by presenting the past in comparison.

2. Martinich, Philosophical Writing (28 Jan 2020)

A useful manual for writing philosophical essays, necessarily treating such fundamental concepts as argument, logic, and criticism. Sound argument follows from true premises (content), suitable structure (validity), and recognizable organization (coherence). Logic is the stuff of validity, often relying on syllogism or dilemma (see especially p16). The author recommends organizing essays in five parts: state the proposition, give the argument for, show the validity of structure, show truth of premises, state the upshot(s). Dilemmas are useful for upending widely held beliefs; counterexamples depend on imagination; reductio ad absurdum is useful in showing a proposition false, since truth cannot follow from invalid premises. There are two common standards of successful philosophical arguments: 1) do not contradict common sense, or 2) do not contradict basic theoretical propositions.