An extended essay on the place of Islam in the global sphere, generally recurring to three themes: sources and consequences of theocracy, Islam’s historical relationship with the West, and Islam in the 20th and 21st centuries. In contrast to Judeo-Christianity, Islam can be seen as a religion subdivided into nations; Christian clergy haven’t enjoyed equivalent social authority in at least three centuries. There are chiefly two political traditions, quietism in authoritarian society and radical activism, both borne of Mohammed’s life (and of course several schools of legal interpretation). As regards the West, the Crusades were unimportant to contemporary Ottomans. The end of the expansionary era (as marked by Lepanto and Vienna) was more significant. Most important, Islam was already superseded by European technological and economic progress, such as Atlantic maritime trade, and well closed to foreign intellectual currents — since the 9th century, only 100,000 Western books have been translated in Arabic, the equivalent of a year’s production in Spain. Muslims never saw their expansion as imperial, but in the modern era, which began with the coming of Napoleon, fundamentalism has required an enemy. In 20th-century Arabia, Wahhabism allied to Saudi nationalism presented themselves as keepers of the holy land; with the decline of pan Arabism — only Palestine didn’t succeed in creating a nation-state — nationalism and fundamentalism have blurred. The Iranian revolution was a fundamentalist coup d’etat, and the author asserts the hostage crisis was a response to improving US ties. Similarly, first Sadat’s accord and then the collapse of the USSR forced Palestinians to talk with Israel. Latterly, terrorist bombings violate the Islamic prohibition against suicide (which is not proof of martyrdom), more evidence that fundamentalism has come to ignore its origins.
Political development
24. Thomson, England in the Nineteenth Century (20 Nov 2017)
A dense yet lively account of the United Kingdom from 1815-1918, identifying the overarching themes of piecemeal reform, the political economy in the world’s first industrial power, and the rise and fall of Liberalism. Key points:
Reform
• Political reform followed significant economic change, and was initiated by Parliament-appointed commission
• The 1832 Reform Bill was the first big event, although it maintained the ascendancy of property over population. Over the long run, industrial concerns won ground at the expense of landowners, while religious disabilities were continually eased
• Implementing the new Poor Law (of 1834) and criminal justice (police work) catalyzed elected local bodies (municipal councils) and simultaneously built conduits for central (Parliamentary or Whitehall) direction
• British government was transformed in the 1840s: ordinary citizens gained civil and economic rights, sacrificing some freedoms
• Gladstone’s first ministry (1868-74), which simplified taxes and also government finance, laid the basis for the 20th-century state by reforming the civil service, military, and judiciary through introduction of competitive exams
• The schools reform of 1870, which the author says was required by continuing extension of the vote (furthered in 1884-85 and reaching full suffrage by 1918), set up local boards to monitor quality and attendance of public schools
• The curtailing of the House of Lords, the arrival of Labour as the Conservatives’ principal opposition, and the suffragette movement together heralded a more violent politics
• Poor relief transformed into demand for ‘social security’, notably through the 1909 Beveridge report, the Insurance Act of 1911, and the establishment of a Labour ministry in 1916
Political Economy
• Toward the start of the century, Commoners came to be the cabinet equals of peers, while Radicals were coequals with Liberals (Whigs) and Conservatives (Tories), through the limited franchise delayed Parliamentary recognition
• Durham’s response to Canadian riots presaged the Commonwealth and allowed for ‘responsible government’ while binding the colonies to the metropole
• Palmerston represented a pre-reform (of 1832) outlook, and acted as a brake up to 1865
• Trade unionism gained momentum after 1870, when economic growth was checked by the US (hitherto expanding westward) and united Germany. The balance of trade was now negative, most food was imported, and money once invested (and reinvested) in colonial enterprises now became vital domestic income
• Britain opted out of the de facto international system in the first half of the 19th century, largely avoiding foreign wars, but could not halt the convergence of Ottoman and Habsburg decline and the dynamics of the German naval race
Liberalism
• Social hardship entered public consciousness when it was no longer taken for granted
• Britain’s sovereign Parliament was more adaptable than continental monarchs
• Each of the Victorian era’s three phases grappled with rapid, broad changes in the country’s political economy. Mid-Victorian complacency (Palmerston, Macaulay, Russell) produced its own reaction (Dickens, Arnold, Carlyle). But reformist zeal sometimes produced overbearing results for the working classes — loss of freedom
• Bentham’s ‘greatest good’ principle animated each era of reformers. Although associated with Liberalism, there was no intrinsic connection. Separately, Liberalism viewed the state as a negative force: laissez faire worked so long as the economy was expanding
• ‘Socialized liberalism’, a fusion of archetypal utilitarianism and an activist state, took root after the panic of 1873
• Reforms often came not from Liberals but Radicals or Tories. Liberals focused on ‘adequate’ moral values; Christianity checked Victorian complacency. The Liberals sought to promote voluntarism and Radicals vied for better elections (faith in democracy); the Tories were paternalistic
• Britain’s sense of historical community and faith in its institutions was challenged in the last phase, most obviously by Home Rule, as progress through conflict turned to a zero-sum worldview
• Yet the Liberal residue in latter-day socialism tempered confrontational instincts — Marx and Engels played little role in England — and set it apart from the continent
22. Craig, Germany 1866-1945 (13 December 2021)
United Germany, though evidencing the thirst for liberty and flourishes of superlative culture, succumbed to the seduction of power and consequences of political failure to embrace liberalism, its people transformed from a Kulturvolk to a Machtvolk. Responsibility stems from Bismarck’s nationalism, which excluded simultaneous transition to popular sovereignty; Hitler’s cataclysm made it newly possible; but Craig’s account overlooks the historic loss of Prussia.
After the Austrian war, Bismarck conciliated liberal opinion in order to coopt the southern Catholic states (opposed to agrarian Prussian aristocrats) which had blocked the Zollparlament in 1868; Bismarck had overestimated the economy’s integrative capacity. No politician dared oppose the chancellor after 1870, yet still he reserved local prerogatives including education, policy, and revenue generation to the lander (especially Bavaria). The constitution, meant to be efficient vis-à-vis provincial rivalries without curtailing the Prussian monarchy or aristocracy, acknowledged 18 states plus Alsace-Lorraine; it contained no bill of citizen rights. Politics did not attract capable men and competing interests were seen to undermine the superior purpose of the Hegelian state. The Kulturkampf set Germans against one another, damaging the authority of civil courts and more generally liberalism. Simultaneously, the Grunderzeit kindled modern anti-Semitism. Foreign policy was defensive, but Bismarck’s manhandling the foreign service undermined its professionalism and his machinations (more so than his overt character) were responsible for his fall. At the end of his career, he had no answers other than threat of violence – a tactic which would tragically persist.
The country’s position deteriorated under the feckless Wilhelm II, who never read the constitution, holding to divine right and direct rule. With von Holstein he sought and failed to draw closer to Russia, seeking like all German elites recognition as a great power, when it would have been better to pull back and redress social imbalances. Bernhard von Bulow hoped an aggressive foreign policy would disarm the left; Bethman Hollweg succeeded to debt and a military which saw itself as an increasingly necessary independent actor. In these 1890s, trade unions sought for social democracy and responsible government, but were demonized by elites, while the parliamentarians had no experience of using supply to leverage the executive arm. Effectively blocked by parties organized on the basis of economic class and so averse to coalition, Bethman become reliant on military influence as well as reserves of power in Prussia, the Conservative Party, the Pan German league, and the agricultural and industrial lobbies. Aside from Wilhelm II himself, Bulow and Tirpiz were the most reckless ministers, the latter converting the Bismarckian policy into grasping Weltpolitik. The arms race with Britain, the imperialism evident in the Baghdad railway, and the exclusion of Russian grain (at behest of Prussians) as well as the social Darwinism of conservative Germany professoriate guided the country toward World War I
In 1914 the problem was to survive a protracted conflict with inferior resources, industrial organization, and sea power. Food was an immediate liability: prewar Germany had imported one-third of supply. Ludendorff’s appointment was a political revolution: power was overtly transferred to the high command. The shocking terms of Brest-Litovsk aroused Western antagonism as well as resistance among Eastern nations which saw the nature of German aggression.
Normalcy persisted During the Berlin commune: ‘most don’t bother to participate in the political events which shape their lives’. The Kiel mutinists were liberals not Bolshevisks. Ebert, facing anarchy, decided to side with the military, at first understandably, over time less plausibly. Weimar ministries came to exist at the sufferance of parties or factions. Conversely, since federal law did not supercede the lander, Weimar’s true (anti-democratic) enemies exploited the gaps. Inflation was rooted not in the government fiscal policies but the wartime administration, which relied on loans not tax. Arts and culture were second to none in Germany history: poetry, novels, Expressionism, Bauhaus. But the bohemians, disappointed by 1918 and opposing contemporary ministries for their military affinities, did little to defend the political order. The universities remained conservative. The ‘average’ German resorted to glorifying war as an outlet for tragedy: the German sin is to take refuge in destiny; the ideal German resists politics, when submitting to the necessity, he works via force.
At the end of Weimar, the Mittelstand was disillusioned with Bruning’s reliance on Socialists, but industrialists did not rush to help Hitler (as often supposed). Conducted under the rubric of Gleichschaltung (‘putting into the same gear’), the Nazi takeover entailed dissolving state government and the Reichsrat, purging the civil service, abolishing political parties, and coopting trade unions and eventually (in 1938) the army. But in 1933’s preparations for purging the Brown Shirts, Hitler claimed revolutions should become evolutions.
Mein Kampf established Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy – but Russia was always the goal. The early success of Hitler’s foreign policy obscured the anarchy of competing planning agencies and willy-nilly commissions. Only SS terror prevented collapse. Germany could have been brought to heel by its balance of payments. Industry shifted from western lander to south central states. Wages kept pace with inflation (although the author notes 20 percent went to taxes!). The giant industrial concerns most benefitted from Jewish confiscation. Following America’s entering World War II, Germans blamed the Fuhrer, remembering the prior conflict. After 1942’s African reverses, Hitler descended from daring strategist to meddling tactician, prohibiting for example retreat from Stalingrad on grounds of morale.
Early on, Nietzsche is given commanding effect: military victories are not political wins; proficiency does not equal virtue or morality. While undoubtedly advanced by recent scholarship, a masterful telling.
10. Beer, Modern British Politics (23 Jun 2018)
Traces the development and practice of British politics from the late 19th century to the 1950s, highlighting the consolidation of government and economic production and consumption in the ‘collective era’. Beer first describes four premodern mindsets: old Tory (hierarchic, corporatist), old Whig (which transposed executive power to the cabinet), liberal, and Radical. The Enclosure Acts of the 1700s indicated the introduction of group politics (albeit aristocracy, the balanced constitution, and mercantilism remained dominant), in a long-term transition from patronage to party. In the 1800s, the primary distinction between liberals and Radicals lay in the theory of representation, one favoring liberty to act one’s conscience (the ‘masterless man’) and the other the ‘will of the majority’; Radical politics nonetheless incompletely utilized party to express class and ideological ends, according to later Socialists. The collective era, which reached its height in the 1950s, introduced or reified corporatist forms of a managed economy in combination with the welfare state. Beer then analyzes the workings of the Labour Party since the 1890s. Socialist doctrine held that party program reflects class interest, and all important decisions were to be taken before reaching Parliament. In 1907, the party formally voted itself power to instruct its MPs, although Radical views of the state’s role in alleviating evil and creating good persisted until the 1920s. The miners union’s joining the Trades Union Congress in 1909 was initially seen as a setback, until its commitment to nationalization during World War I. In 1917, Labour broke with David Lloyd George; in 1918 it committed to state ownership of the means of production, a which was unchallenged until 1951. Beer writes that Labour had to do so to differentiate itself after the ‘entente cordial’ with Liberals in 1907. On taking power as a minority government in 1929, Ramsay MacDonald faced the choice of ideology or pragmatism. Needing Liberal support, he along with Snowden, Thomas, Henderson, and Webb chose the latter. By 1931, absent a clear answer to the depression, MacDonald was forced to accede to 10 percent cut in unemployment benefits in order to win loans from New York banks. Allowed to play a large role in Churchill’s wartime government, Atlee executed the Socialist nationalization program over 1945-51; however, pressed by increasingly negative balance of payments and simultaneous demand for domestic goods, the party-government determined to steer workers into export trades or production of popular goods. The problem became closing the ‘manpower gap’ and reducing volatility of demand, finance being secondary. But after the TUC’s 1946 opposition to wage restraint, Hugh Dalton was replaced by Stafford Cripps, who returned from physical controls to market manipulation – a shift which included manufacturers accepting reduced prices and profits. The deal fell apart in 1950 (following 1949’s devaluation of sterling), at which time the unions asserted a measure of independence from Labour, in order to directly participate in collectivist bargaining. This was crucial in forging the new social contract, the paradigm of the managed economy, which Beer dates to 1940 (not 1945, because it was then workers accepted sacrifices to win the war). Henceforth, class was again not inherently political and determinist. In the 1950s, commitment to nationalization and its residual class image came to hurt Labour (Beer notes that 1/3 of the working class consistently voted Conservative throughout), presaging party change. The Fabians counterattacked but the Parliamentary leadership along with the TUC, which provided more than 50 percent of party revenue, prevailed. Turning to the Conservative party, Beer revisits the old Tory and Disraeli’s ‘Tory democracy’ mindsets: belief in hierarchy; that society is an organic unit with a traditional (not rational) social ethic; that politics isn’t the highest calling but rather is an obligation in service of society; that the governing class leads by virtue of talent; that voters choose leaders, not policy, because of the leadership’s being in tune with changing circumstances, tradition, interest groups, and of course electoral calculation. Thus, in the 1930s the less ideological, more adaptable Tories converted to monetary expansion, mercantilism, and industrial and agriculture ‘rationalization’, thereby abandoning gold and free trade. Tariff ‘reform’, headed by Chamberlain, was an important step toward the managed economy. Trade associations, rising in response to unions (and in contrast to US antitrust doctrine), were the gateway to producer group representation. By the 1950s, the Conservatives too were ready for collectivism, in which 1) the managed economy relied on bargaining with producer groups and 2) the welfare state accommodated consumer interests, as represented by party-government bidding for votes. In the collective era, government couldn’t be separated from production and consumption: ‘consumer sovereignty’ trumped popular sovereignty, Beer concludes. Yet differences remained: Labour focused on equality of outcomes, the Tories, who presumed inequality because of hierarchy, on distribution of power. Thus the question of morality – the just distribution of power to rule – persisted: voluntarism, the view that human wishes are the basis of legitimacy, conflicts with rationalism, a theory of fair ends. Apart from Beer’s framework, collectivism was upended by the reemergence of supply-side economics, that prices communicate demand and so the allocation of resources and rewards.
22. Sampson, Mandela (5 Dec 2020)
An authorized biography, bolstered by the author’s contemporaneous journalism, seeking to assess the political temperament and performance of Nelson Mandela. Prepossessing the demeanor of a tribal chieftain and educated by Wesleyans, Mandela’s prison years instilled discipline and broadened vision, the crucial step toward peaceful revolution and African statesmanship par excellence. Taking to Johannesburg in the 1950s, where he practiced law and politics making expert (if ‘vicious’) use of the Socratic method, Mandela discovered a cultural energy comparable to the Harlem renaissance of the 1920s. He was impulsive and of two minds, torn between multiracial communism and black nationalism. Mandela opposed the socialistic element of 1956’s Freedom Charter, but contemporaries thought that if he wasn’t a member of the South African Communist Party, it was ‘merely tactical’. Less enamored of nonviolence than Oliver Tambo or Walter Sisulu, he abandoned the approach after the Sharpeville riots failed to catalyze political change. Following his capture and trial, Robben Island isolated Mandela from daily tactics: the African National Congress inmates turned to collegial development of strategy while learning to master animosity toward the Afrikaners. Meanwhile, the author tends to jump ahead consistent with contemporary left-liberal views, blaming the CIA and Thatcher for opposing sanctions, being slow to reconcile to the ‘inevitable’ ascendancy of Mandela and the ANC (soon coming to power in 1987?!), and failing to anticipate the end of the Cold War (in 1978!). Sampson notably overlooks that the Cold War’s end made it safer for the Nationalist government to retrench. But the dynamics of Mandela’s negotiations with Botha and deKlerk read more reliably, particularly in the portrayal of his views on renouncing violence, as do his thoughts on opposing general amnesty in exchange for commencing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Mandela misapprehended the cost of the ANC’s historic alliance with the USSR, and was slow to grasp the prospect of nationalization as deterring Western investors. In office, modeling is mixed (i.e., antagonistic) cabinet on Clemenceau’s, he displayed a quiet dignity, his forgiveness establishing moral supremacy, in contrast (the author says) to aggressive black American politicians. A persistent themes is the tension between the demands on a politician (i.e., winning power, projecting ideology) and the vision of a statesman (long-term good of the community). The last word: ‘You don’t lead by position but by the strength of your ideas’ (p. 529).
19. Howard, Lessons of History (1 Nov 2018)
The French Revolution spurred the rise of nationalism in 19th-century Europe, a phenomenon which proved the major impetus for statecraft and warfare over the succeeding two centuries. More than simply self-conscious culture, nationalism in the 1800s was ideological, entwining a loose worldview with a defined sense of universal (often cultural) mission. It complemented economic modernization while overshadowing Marxism, which in its early phase had no conception of statecraft. Nationalism complicated life for Eastern Europe’s Jews, but (in its imperial guise) looked in colonial lands like routine military conquest. For social Darwinians cum nationalists, war was the ultimate test of folk strength – a view which died out after the carnage of World War I. In the 19th century, the Prussian mindset conflicted with German nationalism; Treitschke’s view that the essence of the state was power (macht), which required an army, bridged the two; ultimately, Nazism replaced Preussentum. Little is said of the interwar era. Howard coopts Churchill to makes a case for postwar British nationalism – as way to consensually accommodate postwar British decline – while giving the Russians a pass because the victorious Soviet army was ‘popular’ in postwar Eastern Europe! They and the Americans were the century’s inheritors of the universal mission, and in the current (when published) century, nationalism rather than social justice or economic equality remained the driver of public spirit. It provides the state apparatus with legitimacy: if unmoored (for example by supranational elites), the structure becomes alienating and oppressive. Turning to warfare, in which the author specializes, Howard’s primary insights are that 1) pre-WWI army doctrines failed to grasp the impact of mechanization despite the evidence of late-19th-century warfare – maneuver was ignored, and 2) in the greatest military literature, the hero cannot win, as abundantly demonstrated in WWI. As to history, the field is meant to train laymen – not professionals – to understand precedents of the contemporary. Howard asserts all ages of are equal interest to the historian, although the book fairly omits the developing world, and is comfortable with historicism though not polemical. In a ranging essay on ‘structure and progress’, he surveys why history has been held valuable and himself settles on its role in tracing society’s movement from the realm of necessity to the realm of choice. Such progress looks a leftward ratchet. The volume is not representative of his professional achievement and perhaps understates his contribution to understanding the relationship of warfare, society, and politics; however, it evinces the postwar bien pensant, the elite who could not see through the Soviets and uphold the enduring value of the liberal society.
20. Dunn, Breaking Democracy’s Spell (4 Nov 2018)
Democracy has successfully established itself worldwide, but its record is poor. The author contends democracy is a formula for ‘direction of legitimate coercion’ over territory and population, for the citizen’s subjection to power without sacrificing dignity. Its good name owes to success of Western governments, particularly the USA, and its strengths are in the capacity to harness sociopolitical struggle; monarchy and aristocracy cannot allow for the possibility of conflict. However, democracy as commonly understood ‘equivocates’ between authoritative standard of right conduct and describing the political character of the regime. In an extended treatment of authoritarian China’s coming to terms with democracy, he shows that Chinese hierarchy includes an obligation to instruct the population. But his alternate example of good government rests on the country’s post-1980 economic growth (the real cost of which is not yet known to the West), and ignores that hierarchy has no tides to the commonweal. (Separately, he adds the true exemplar of democracy is India because of its size.) Dunn does not like democracy’s lack of alignment to egalitarian and leftist outcomes, which he dresses up as ‘reliable’ ties to justice and utility. He equates self-government with egalitarian outcomes, instead of opportunity. Ultimately, he seems to dislike Western (especially American) democracy because Americans don’t listen to their betters. He laments the failure of progressives to make the case for the folly of the Iraq invasion or the necessity of climate-change legislation, and proposes the university can steer the world out of its problems. He shows no concept of Thucydidean (or Lincolnian) persuasion (i.e., to know what to do and to be able to explain it), of knowing and representing the group. Dunn appears most concerned power that elites don’t hold power; it’s revealing that his critique lacks Fukuyama’s treatment of accountability and order (i.e., rule of law). The polemic scores a few points but abstruse language muddies the argument, which at any rate fails to really address the important questions of who should rule in the 21st century.
9. Bagehot, Physics and Politics (8 Jun 2019)
A sociological study of characteristics which distinguish prehistoric (‘savage’), stationary, and progressive states, observing that ‘government by discussion’ combined with deliberation before acting produces the ideal nation. Lawfulness is the prime need of early societies: it’s more important elites know the application of custom than to achieve equality or fairness. Revolutionary principles don’t advance societies which don’t yet know their own nature, and it’s well that prehistoric races mixed little, for it would have produced a ‘general carelessness and skepticism … encourag(ing) the nation that right and wrong had no real existence, but were mere creatures of human opinion’ (p. 43) Custom binds age to age: an initial act of will leads to unconscious habit. But custom becomes a trap, a state of arrested development; further to oppose custom stifles innovation and invites opprobrium where there’s belief in collective guilt. Accumulated custom, pace Rousseau and Strauss, is thus significantly different than prehistory. Only government which encourages the discussion of significant, and more and more, matters makes the transition. Classical Athens was first to do so, followed by early modern Europe (after the interlude of medieval Christendom). Ultimately, order and choice are equally necessary for social progress: the energy of progressive nationals grows by coalescence and competition. Victorian England is a leading exemplar. In the course, Bagehot elaborates that military prowess (war) is the most obvious form of competition, of bringing social advantage to bear; the Jewish race is the sole exception of a nation achieving ‘variability’ without losing legality, probably because it’s skewed to the law; unconscious imitation is the main conduit of social catalytics, for disbelief often needs more reason than acquiescence. Though susceptible to charge of discredited social Darwinism, the problem Bagehot set to address cannot be explained away, and his effort has not been superseded by postmodern thought.