23. Walsh, Introduction to Philosophy of History (14 Dec 2019)

Surveys concepts in philosophy of history, toward an understanding of a discipline that’s independent of science. Citing Collingwood’s view of the emergence of history as an early 20th-century phenomenon and noting contemporary British aversion to Continental views, the author commences with a dialectic approach to truth and fact (i.e., the unbiased search for all evidence), objectivity (unbiased but not as in science replicable, due to the personality of the practitioner), and explanation (including those events in which the truth is expressed). History can be objective in that we have rational conviction in the findings, as a portrait artist sees a subject from a point of view but certainly has real insight into the subject. That is, the historian has presuppositions but is not cut off from all understanding; his responsibility is to present an interpretation of all the evidence he admits. To establish cause is to establish means and motive, or to identify necessary conditions, or to determine the balance of the efficacy of forces. Colligation is a related process of rendering isolated events intelligible, dependent on connecting thought to action; however, it tends toward teleology or even Hegel’s universals in disguise. Still, cause / reason for adoption of ideas (and degree of success) is to be demonstrated. Memory provides access to the past but is not fact – it’s insufficient for verification. Truth and fact are divided between correspondence (to other accepted facts) and coherence (to accepted ideas or theories). Correspondence raises questions of which fact? Coherence lacks an element of independence (i.e., the past is dead). Oakeshott belongs to the latter school. Knowledge of the past must rest on evidence that is present. Walsh attempts a synthesis: all statements are relative to the constellation of evidence (coherence), all fact-based premises are independent (correspondence). As new evidence is constantly emerging, conclusions are inevitably provisional.

In history, to know the big things it’s necessary to know the details. The narration of events such that they explain themselves makes them ready-made for analysis. Whereas instrumental events are closer to science, easily recognized as fact. That is, the event cannot be falsified. The author accuses Oakeshott of an overly theoretic history, one that is independent of inquiry, and so a reductio ad absurdum that implicitly contrasts with Collingwood. Could it not be that facts suggest questions and sometimes so too the historian’s worldview? For to suggest history is solely the latter is to concede Heideggerian historicism. Further, history may not be teleological but it can reasonably be seen as a sequence of problems or events that cascade into one another.

Science differs from history in aspiring to the universal, in being predictive, whereas history is particular and cannot be replicated. (Collingwood: a scientist looks at mere phenomena, a historian for thoughts within events.) ‘Positivist’ historians, most obviously Marxists but also those associated with Popper, view history akin to engineering: practical application of known principles. Idealists are concerned with thought and experience, and unique and immediate character. Collingwood controversially asserted once the fundamental idea(s) have been identified, the matter’s essence could be intuited; Walsh counters this may be so if studying Admiral Nelson but not if a witch doctor. 

Kant believed in an engine of history, following in the metaphysical tradition of seeking to understand the source of evil. Universal laws of nature, especially causality, do not provide the particular relations of events – the principle assumed is a material principle. The problem is relation of a priori to empirical elements. It’s too easy to fall into dogma. Hegel, the exemplar of the dialectic, believed the triad of fact, ideas (i.e., logic), and spirit must be reconciled to history; history is most aligned with spirit. Hegel was trying to make sense of a master narrative, and used the dialectic more than Kant or Enlightenment thinkers; he used a priori grounds of the triad. Ultimately, he identified the free with the self-contained or self-sufficient, and thus not with the individual but with society.

Seeing in the past certain preconceptions is not a private matter, it is metaphysics in Collingwood’s sense. Walsh uses the analogy of foreign travel: curiosity fades to learning how the locals see things, and then comparing with how things are at home. In a famous dispute, Trevelyan prevailed over Bury’s view of history as a science: the purpose of history is understanding the character of one’s own time by presenting the past in comparison.

12. Duckworth, Grit (4 Jul 2021)

Propounds the nature and virtue of tenacity, ‘grit’, illustrating with American sporting and other contemporary examples. Talent plus effort equals skill; skill plus effort equals achievement. Environment greatly determines one’s tendencies to meet challenges; yet one can learn to be optimistic. Once proficient, an individual’s deliberate practice propels advancement through demanding objectives and laborious work at isolated elements. Thus deliberate work is the opposite of ‘flow’, albeit complementary in that both produce satisfaction. Duckworth treats purpose as the outcome of cultivated interest, however, dismissing ethics (as well as hedonism) as biologically determined, baked into the cake, so to speak. The slight reveals the primary shortcoming of her work and psychology in general. As Collingwood observed in An Essay on Metaphysics, the ‘science of feeling’ lacks an intrinsic measure of right and wrong. It ‘wipe[s] out the old sciences of thought, logic and ethics, with their criteriological methods and their guiding notions of truth and error, good and evil. …The only difference between a logical and a psychological science of thought is that a logic of thought faces the fact that thought is self-critical and consequently attempts to give some account of the criteria used in this self-criticism, while a psychological science does not. …Psychology has always approached the study of thought with a perfectly clear and conscious determination to ignore one whole department of the truth, namely to ignore the self-critical function of thought and the criteria which that function implied’ (pp. 114-116). In fine, grit is valuable for those with well-defined teleology. All of Duckworth’s subjects are such paragons, but tenacity in pursuit of questionable ends is no benefit.