Strategy

12. Petraeus and Roberts, Conflict (29 June 2025)

by kurto

Studies the development of counterinsurgency doctrine in the postwar era, characterized by asymmetric military-political operations. Selected case studies illustrate the thesis that the people are the prize, until in later phases the conventional or the exit becomes possible.

Between 1943 and 1975, almost all western Europe’s colonies were handed back, in aggregate history’s largest recorded transfer of territory. Malaya, 1952-54, was among the most successful counterinsurgency campaigns. The British protected villages, eschewed torture for productive interrogation, and trained locals in security measures and low-key fighting and maneuvers. Contemporary Borneo evidenced the importance of British offensive action: containment fails if solely passive. In this era, generally the British come of favorably to the Americans.
In Vietnam, the US ignored winning the populace, instead seeking to stop a North Korea-style invasion, though the engagement’s different nature was already evident by 1959. Generalship under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations reprised Eisenhower-era tradecraft: Johnson even authorized Westmoreland to send troops against insurgents operating independent of South Viet forces. 95% of combat forces engaged in search-and-destroy mission instead of clear-and-hold; Westmoreland did not retain what had been cleared. (Later the Americans made the mistake of rotating individuals not units, at the expense of continuity.) The authors conclude, however, that failure in Vietnam bought time for Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to stave off Communist expansion. Relatedly, if government is charged with protecting individual rights, then rights must inhere in individuals.
Indochina raised the question of how to separate anti-communism from nationalism. In Algeria, the European population was approximately 10 percent of 10.5 million, a substantially higher proportion, pointing up new questions of self-determination. Torture in that African country was considered antithetical to French values, making it unpopular in France.
1973’s Yom Kippur war showed deterrence works only when consequences are seen to be overwhelming. (Conventionally, attacking forces ought to outnumber defenders by at least 3:1, concentrating on the most vulnerable points.) Money spent on deterrence is seldom wasted, in comparison with the cost of war.
The Falklands War illustrated the evolution of naval campaigning, that is the integration of tactical land action. Smallish military operations in Grenada and Panama offered further lessons; absent Grenda, it’s doubtful the US would have improved its joint operations. As it turned out the USSR saw evidence for conceding.
Vietnam had introduced casualty rates as a focus of domestic criticism; 1993’s debacle in Somalia persuaded the US to stay out of Rwanda. Then the Falklands, Iraq, Serbia, and Gaza brought forth a just war-flavored idea of acceptable enemy rates – at least in Western countries. The UN has usually failed in its original mission of preventing interstate conflict. (It’s better at managing children, refugees, and world health(!).) To what extent are powerful nations responsible for the affairs of failed states even though they have no national interest there?
At the start of the 1990s in Iraq, precision munitions constituted 2% of armament; at the end in the Balkans, the proportion had grown to 90%. Hence the future of the West depends in part on the best fighter planes and pilots. In the 21st century, Western armies have become very dependent on civilian technologies such as robotics, data analytics, and AI, a reversal of the prior century. (AI is tactically brilliant but strategically banal, George Friedman writes.) After a century which favored mobility and agility, drones may reintroduce the advantages of mass and quantity. Not only supply chains but generalized interdependence of the Western countries has created more vulnerability. But the authors denigrate ‘isolationism’ (presumably in contradistinction to freeloading).
Turning to Petraeus’ direct participation, the primary issue confronting Afghanistan’s postwar government in 2001 was incorporating the defeated Taliban. Managing the country was a more difficult matter than Iraq, despite a lower level of social violence, because of its geography: no roads, harsh winters, and the proximity of sanctuary in Pakistan. Karzai would ultimately fail to assemble a catholic loya jirga, despite military and civil assistance outstripping the Marshall Plan. By 2006, the Taliban was again on the offensive. Counterinsurgency tactics must persist in the postwar. Relatedly, there’s nothing wrong with planning to withdraw, but announcement removes every reason to cooperate.
In post-Saddam Iraq, Petraeus’ predecessor Jerry Bremer went too far in replacing the prior regime, notably security personnel, thereby destroying the successor state’s foundation. Maliki ruled in narrow interests, as in Vietnam, leading to civil war. Condoleezza Rice’s clear-and-hold would have performed better than Don Rumsfeld’s soon-as-possible transition. Further, Bremer ruled as a viceroy. Every liberating army has a half-life before it becomes an occupier: stripping back too far reduces both goodwill and time. Petraeus elaborates his technical approach; one wonders what was censored?
In contemporary Ukraine, Putin didn’t see the advantages of the World War II offensive had shifted in the Internet era to defensive postures, facilitated by distributed communications and low-tech harassment. Russia’s numerical advantage was too low, especially for urban warfare, and Moscow’s ineffectively steered tactical adjustments, deployment of reserves, logistics, etc. (The Ukrainians could rely on fixed-base logistics, the Russians could not.) Evidence as at time of writing is warfare had returned to the strategy of the hedgehog: when there is little sanctuary, the defense must disperse.
Modern military leadership entails grasp of the strategic situation – getting the big picture right – effectively communicating to troops and also civilian leaders, and driving execution. Officers recursively refine, adapt, and supplement.

8. Gordon, Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914 (25 May 2023)

by kurto

Traces efforts to establish an imperial defense strategy encompassing Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the Cape Colony in the years leading to World War I. The burden fell on Britain’s naval leaders, as the sea is not divisible, and while Churchill and Haldane made late efforts to establish political consensus, the matter was never solved: the British ultimately withdrew so as to defend the North Sea against Germany.
From 1850, Lord Grey championed relieving the British taxpayer, who shouldered 90 percent of defense costs. The Mills committee of 1862 commenced a decade-long withdrawal of military (army) postings to the dominions, paradoxically making imperialism a safe political cause. Britain thought the maturing colonies should progress from self-sufficiency to enlightened interest in the empire but the colonials wrangled over autonomy and the size of naval-subsidy payments to London. 1878’s Russian war scare carried the debate to more comprehensive review of imperial defense; in the following decade, the colonies were asked to participate in London’s councils.
Whether the empire ought to be a zollverein or kriegsverein remained unanswered: imperial federation were dead by the turn of the century, and as political imperialism waned, the Colonial Office’s Colonial Defense Committee (which morphed into the Committee for Imperial Defense) made the running. Yet the dominions were ‘patriotically’ responsive to the Boer War demands. Though the 1902 Colonial Conference produced no real advances in defense doctrine. Fisher’s appointment to the Admiralty and the initiation of two parliamentary committees in fact brought technical matters to a new phase. In this decade, the Canadians were pleased to acquire and staff two bases; the Aussies basked in the visit of America’s White Fleet, proof of a second partner against Japan.
The dreadnought crisis of 1909 opened the way to Canadian- and Australian-controlled navies, since Britain needed to husband cash to stave off the German buildup. Aussies welcomed Deakin’s efforts, while the Canadians contested Laurier’s for it cut across Anglo-French rivalries. (The New Zealanders, neither worried about the United States nor evidencing latent distrust of Irish immigrants, were typically content to sit close by the UK.) Thought the navy’s ‘blue water’ doctrine masked the degree to which the UK was retreating, the metropole knew the fight would be in Europe.

15. Morison, Strategy and Compromise (18 Nov 2007)

by kurto

Limns the Allies’ key strategic decisions of World War II, dividing them geographically between the two major theaters and presenting them sequentially within each. Europe takes pride of place because America committed to defeating Hitler first. The author, an admiral turned Harvard professor, is frequently critical of the British predilection for nipping Europe’s edges (as well as its quibbles with American resources sent to the Pacific), but acknowledges Overlord would have been more difficult before 1944, once Torch was approved in 1942. Island hopping the way to Japan also was a synthetic solution (thus the title), but Morison speaks relatively little of the decision to use atomic weaponry. Admirable introduction, great Mill Valley library pickup.

7. Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy (6 Nov 2009)

by kurto

Illuminates enduring ideas and uses of military strategy since the 16th century. Leading thinkers and practitioners oscillate between views of strategy (following Clausewitz, the systematic approach to warfare absent one’s foes; tactics incorporate active engagement) as science and artifice. Clausewitz; Smith and Hamilton, who identified economics as a source of power; and Gordon Craig’s study of politicians as emergent strategists are among the most interesting chapters. The rise of German strategy, in various phases and components, inevitably forms a leading theme, given the country’s responsibility for the World War II and oft-presumed culpability for World War I. Cold War nuclear thinking is rather less interesting, particularly as the scholarship predates understanding Reagan. The next frontier is strategy in the era of terrorism, particularly Islamo-fascism. An outstanding collection.